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A DECISION MODEL FOR LEASE PARTIES IN SALE-
LEASEBACKS OF REAL ESTATE
NANCY E. SHURTZ*
Although the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 19811 made sub-
stantial changes m the tax treatment of sale-leasebacks of equip-
ment, it left virtually unaffected sale-leasebacks of real estate. In
an inflationary economy, when interest rates and construction
costs are rising, the sale-leaseback is an important device for both
financial and income tax reasons.2 But even though a particular
sale-leaseback arrangement may achieve one or more financial
goals, it does not necessarily follow that the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice will recognize it for income tax purposes. Courts, in determim-
ing whether a sale and lease of real estate is valid for tax purposes,
have held uniformly that substance controls over form.3 Therefore,
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania;
J.D., Olho State; LL.M., Georgetown.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. The new Act creates a "safe harbor" rule that guaran-
tees a transaction will be characterized as a lease for purposes of allocating investment cred-
its and the cost recovery allowances to the nominal lessor. To come within this rule (1) the
property being leased must be new § 38 property (or certain qualified mass commuting vel-
cles); (2) the leased property must be leased within three months after its acquisition or, in
the case of a sale-leaseback transaction, it must be purchased by the lessor within three
months of the lessor's acquisition for a purchase price that does not exceed the adjusted
basis of the property in the hands of the lessee at the time of the lessor's purchase; (3) both
the lessor and lessee must affirmatively elect to treat the lessor as the owner of the property;,
(4) the lessor must be a corporation, a partnership of corporations, or a grantor trust, the
grantor and beneficiaries of which are all corporations; (5) at all times during the term of
the lease and at the time the property is placed in service, the lessor must have a minimm
"at-risk" investment of not less than 10% of the adjusted basis of the property;, and (6) the
term of the lease, including all extensions, cannot exceed the greater of 90% of the useful
life of the property under § 167, or 150% of the present class life (ADR midpoint as of
January 1, 1981).
If these requirements are met, the economic substance of the transaction is disregarded.
Thus, whether there is a bargain purchase price, whether the lessee may use the property
after the lease term, and who has the incidents of ownership are unimportant. See H.R.
REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 217-18 (1981).
2. How Leasebacks Beat the High Cost of Money, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 12, 1981, at 26-27.
3. The substance over form principle was first set forth in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935), in which the Court held that "[tihe legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the
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rather than holding that an arrangement is a sale-leaseback, courts
may find the arrangements to be in substance a financing device,
or even a mere sham."
Unfortunately the cases, in examining the substance of the
transaction, have focused on different factors. Early cases ex-
amined the parties' intent as determined from the facts and cir-
cumstances. Later cases scrutinized the economic realities of the
transaction. Lately, courts merely have listed the numerous factors
that indicate a valid sale-leaseback. No single test or combination
of tests seems to be absolutely determinative.
Analysis of the seminal cases, however, reveals a useful frame-
work for predicting whether the courts will find a transaction to be
a sham, a financing device, or a valid sale and lease. This frame-
work is valuable even though different code sections may be at is-
sue in a given case.
The goal of this article is to present a decision model to assist
tax planners and ultimately the courts in the difficult problem of
law permits, cannot be doubted," but "the question for determination is whether what was
done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended." Id. at 469. The
Court went on to say that tax statutes do not intend that taxpayers cast transactions in
forms so as to come within their provisions when in fact there is no substance behind the
use of the forms, when the transaction is but a sham, or when the economic reality of the
transaction does not comport with the form.
4. For an analysis of sale-leaseback transactions, see Aitkin, Coping With the Tough New
Court Tests for Deductions in Leaseback Situations, 44 J. TAX'N 47 (1976); Cary, Corporate
Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Con-
siderations, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1948); Duncan, Financing the Acquisition of Property
(Other Than Real Estate or a Going Business); Purchase or Lease; Dealings Among Re-
lated Parties, 26 INsT. ON FED. TAX'N, 619 (1968); Dreier, Real Estate Leasing Transactions,
32 INST. ON FED. TAx'N 1655 (1974); Glazman, Supreme Court Indicates How to Obtain Tax
Benefits of Sale and Leaseback Arrangements, TAX'N FOR AccT. 10 (1978); Kronovet, Char-
acterization of Real Estate Leases: An Analysis and Proposal, 32 TAX LAW. 757 (1979);
Kaster, Sale-Leaseback: Effect on Net Leases of the Sun Oil Company Loan-or-Lease Cri-
teria, 48 J. TAX'N 194 (1978); Marcus, Real Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured Loans,
2 REAL EST. L.J. 664 (1974); Morris, Sale-Leaseback Transactions of Real Property-A
Proposal, 30 TAX LAW. 701 (1977); Rosenberg & Weinstein, Sale-Leasebacks: An Analysis
of These Transactions After the Lyon Decision, 45 J. TAX'N 146 (1976); Solomon & Fones,
Sale-Leasebacks and the Shelter-Oriented Investor: An Analysis of Frank Lyon Co. and
Est. of Franklin, 56 TAXES 618 (1978); Weinstein & Silvers, The Sale and Leaseback Trans-
action After Frank Lyon Company, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 337 (1978); Zarrow & Gordon,
Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback Decision in Lyon Lists Multiple Criteria, 49 J. TAX'N 42
(1978); Note, Problems of Judicial Interpretation of Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Taxa-
tion: Description, Analysis, and Proposed Revision, 33 TAx. LAW. 237 (1979); Note, Taxa-
tion of Sale and Leaseback Transactions-A General Review, 32 VAN. L. REv. 945 (1979).
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determining whether a sale-leaseback of real estate is valid for in-
come tax purposes. 5 Part I briefly describes the business and tax
5. This framework is valuable even though different code sections may be at issue m a
given case. Among the issues which arise in sale-leaseback transactions are: should a rent
deduction be allowed to the lessee under I.R.C. § 162(a)(3); should the depreciation deduc-
tion be allowed to the lessor under § 167; should an interest deduction be allowed the lessor
on the purchase indebtedness under § 163; and, if a partnership is the buyer, should the
partners be entitled to deduct their distributive share of losses under § 703? In all of these
instances, the main issue is who "owns" (in a tax sense) the property. The owner is entitled
to the depreciation deduction, the interest deduction, and in the case of partners, the part-
nership losses, but is not entitled to the rent deduction.
The following is a summary of how the model in the present article was constructed.
(1) All litigated sale-leaseback, trust-leaseback, gift-leaseback, and option to
purchase/conditional sale cases were read to determine which cases had meaning-
ful tax similarities that could be used to develop a model. The model covered all
litigated sale-leaseback cases involving real estate. Nonrecourse financing as well
as recourse financing cases were included. I eliminated trust-leaseback and gift-
leaseback cases because donative intent was a primary consideration for entering
into the transaction; economic substance of the transaction was unimportant.
Similarly, sale-leaseback cases involving related parties were eliminated. The bus-
iness purpose for the transaction appeared to be the determining factor for the
validity of those transactions. I excluded sale-leaseback cases that were consid-
ered like-kind exchanges because the tax issues discussed in the cases were differ-
ent from those in taxable exchanges. Sale-leasebacks of equipment were also
eliminated because the "safe harbor" rules of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 control these transactions. These rules specifically disregard the economic
substance of the transaction. Finally, option to purchase/conditional sale cases
were eliminated. These cases had many similarities with the sale-leasebacks of
real estate, but they primarily involved equipment.
(2) After narrowing the model to the sale-leaseback of real estate, 68 different factors
mentioned in the cases were identified and grouped into ine categories, each
representing a general principle or postulate: (a) financial institutions as parties
to the transaction, (b) conduit where no financial institution is involved, (c) likeli-
hood the lease property will revert automatically to the seller-lessee, (d) bargain
purchase price or economic compulsion to exercise the option, (e) comparison of
lease term with useful life of property, (f) rate of return similarities, (g) value
disparities, (h) benefits and burdens, and (i) purpose of entering into the
transaction.
(3) The postulates were then subdivided into questions that when answered would
determine the validity or invalidity of a sale-leaseback transaction: (a) is the
buyer-lessor a financial institution? (b) is a financial institution an indirect party
to the sale-leaseback transaction-that is, neither lessor nor lessee? (c) is there a
conduit arrangement even though no financial institution is involved? (d) will the
property revert automatically to the seller-lessee by the end of the lease term? (e)
is there a bargain purchase price or economic compulsion to exercise the option?
(f) is the term of the lease plus renewals greater than or equal to the useful life of
the property9 (g) are there no rate of return similarities? (h) are there clear rate
of return similarities? (i) is the sales price too high or too low in relation to the
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reasons for entering these transactions. Part II considers relevant
case law to the present. Part III outlines a nine-step decision
model developed from the cases.
PART I
A. The Nature of a Sale-Leaseback Transactin
In a typical sale-leaseback, an owner of property sells the, prop-
erty to an investor who immediately leases it back to the seller.6
The investor usually makes a cash down payment and finances the
remaining purchase price with a recourse or nonrecourse loan.7 Al-
though some sale-leasebacks involve equipment,8 most litigated
cases concern buildings, or buildings and land.9 Typically, the lease
term plus renewals extends over a substantial number of years,
and the lease includes an option to purchase the property at the
end of the lease term.
1. Non-tax Reasons for Entenng into a Sale-Leaseback Ar-
rangement-Seller-Lessee
The primary non-tax advantage of a sale-leaseback is that it pro-
fair market value of the property or the cash flow from the property9 (j) does the
equity interest lie with the seller-lessee? (k) is the purpose of the transaction to
avoid the payment of taxes?
(4) Next, the postulates and questions were arranged in order of importance. Hypo-
thetical cases were developed that might conflict, falsify, or discredit the principle
and the resulting conflicts were reconciled.
(5) Finally, the model was tested against the cases that distinguish an option to
purchase from a conditional sale. Many of the factors in these cases are the same
as those in sale-leaseback cases because the courts consider the substance of the
transaction. The results m these cases if decided today would be different because
of the "safe harbor" rule of the Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981. That fact,
however, does not affect the utility of the model. These cases were not analyzed
m the text of the paper, but were discussed in the footnotes.
The result is a well-defined, concise model that should prove to be a useful device for a
future researcher who may wish to develop similar models in other areas of the law.
6. In some early sale-leaseback cases the property was sold to financial institutions.
7. The investor, of course, could pay all cash or make no down payment. Increasingly,
sale-leaseback arrangements involve nonrecourse financing in which the investor is not lia-
ble personally for the purchase of the property, i.e., liability goes only to the property itself.
8. Keeling v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 954 (1971).
9. One case, Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. dented, 436
U.S. 944 (1978), involved only land.
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vides more cash to the seller-lessee than would a mortgage on the
property. The cash generated from the sale is generally equal to
the fair market value of the property, whereas a conventional
mortgagee by law can lend funds to a commercial borrower only up
to a percentage (usually seventy to eighty percent) of the prop-
erty's fair market value. Therefore, the sale-leaseback enables the
seller-lessee to retain possession and use of the property while ob-
taining needed working capital.
Second, if a lease meets Financial Accounting Standards Board
standards for operating leases,10 it does not appear on the balance
sheet. By replacing fixed assets with current assets and possibly
eliminating a liability that the seller may have had before the sale,
the seller-lessee's current ratio increases.1 This, in turn, may in-
crease the credit standing and borrowing capacity of the seller-
lessee.
Third, a seller-lessee may want to construct an office or other
building during a period of inflation when surging construction
costs, accompanied by uncertain "take out" commitments, raise
the cost of capital and limit its overall availability. During this
time the sale-leaseback device makes construction possible without
restricting available operating lines of credit.
Fourth, the sale-leaseback allows a seller-lessee to circumvent
state and federal loan restrictions because sale-leaseback provi-
sions, unlike loan agreements, do not contain prohibitions on the
debtor's financial undertakings. In addition, a sale-leaseback can
be structured so as not to breach provisions of a prior loan agree-
ment that place barriers on additional obligations of the debtor.
10. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13, "Account for Leases," FASB,
Stamford, Conn., Nov. 1976, sets forth four criteria which require the lessee to capitalize the
lease:
(1) the lease must not transfer ownership of the property to the lessee by the end of
the lease term;
(2) the lease must not contain a bargain purchase option;
(3) the lease term must not equal 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the
leased property, and
(4) the present value at the begimng of the lease term of the minimum lease pay-
ments must not equal or exceed 90% of the value of the leased property.
Criteria (3) and (4) do not apply when the beginning of the lease term falls within the last
25% of the total estimated economic life of the lease property.
11. The current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
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Fifth, many companies find the sale-leaseback device a better
way to raise capital than selling bonds in the market.12 With rising
interest rates and volatile capital markets, businesses can save
large sums of money when financing a building through a sale-
leaseback. Again, a lease, unlike a bond obligation, is not included
on the balance sheet.
2. Non-tax Reasons for Entering into a Sale-Leaseback Ar-
rangement-Buyer-Lessor
First, the rent the lessor receives usually represents a higher re-
turn than a mortgage. 18 Second, unlike mortgages, rents are more
easily increased. In the absence of rent control, investors can tie
rents to sales or to the inflation rate. Third, state usury laws fre-
quently may be circumvented by a sale-leaseback. Fourth, because
most sale-leasebacks involve "net" leases, the buyer-lessor does not
bear the expense of maintenance, taxes, and other expenses of op-
erating the property Fifth, ownership of the property may be a
good hedge against inflation.
3. Tax Reasons-Seller-Lessee
First, the seller-lessee is entitled to a rent deduction. Typically,
the seller's rent deduction is significantly greater than the com-
bmed interest and depreciation the seller could have deducted had
he retained the property, particulary if the property is land or if
the property is fully or almost fully depreciated. 14 Even if rental
payments are lower than payments under the ownership alterna-
tive, the seller-lessee may gain a significant advantage if the short-
term earnings of the business are improved because of the lower
rent payments.
Second, usually no gain is recognized from a sale-leaseback
transaction. Section 1031(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
12. How Leasebacks Beat the High Cost of Money, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 12, 1981, at 26-27.
13. One must recogmze, however, that by obtaming this higher rate of return, the buyer
forgoes any rights he would have had as a creditor under a mortgage loan.
14. In the case of land, the sale-leaseback in effect allows a depreciation deduction to the
seller-lessee in the form of a rent deduction. In the case of nearly fully depreciated property,
any recent purchases of improvements may offset the gain from the sale-leaseback because
the improvements may be depreciable at accelerated rates.
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that no gain is recognized when property, held for productive use
in a trade or business or for investment purposes, is exchanged for
property which is of a "like kind."15 According to the regulations,
an exchange of a fee for a leasehold of thirty or more years is a
like-kind exchange:1 6 it is viewed as an exchange of a fee interest
for a leasehold interest in the property plus cash received m the
amount of the sale price.' 7 If, however, the sale is not a like-kind
exchange, gain is recognized under section 1002.18 The gain, if any,
is capital gain (whether or not the property is section 1231 prop-
erty or investment property), but when certain depreciable section
1245 or section 1250 property is sold part of the gain is recaptured
at ordinary rates. 19 A loss also may be recognized, assuming that
the fair market value of the property is lower than the property's
adjusted basis and there is no like-kind exchange. In this case, the
seller is entitled to an ordinary loss deduction if the property is
investment property. Such a loss may be advantageous to offset
other capital or ordinary income of the seller.
4. Tax Reasons-Buyer-Lessor
First, the buyer-lessor is entitled to a depreciation deduction
taken on the purchase price or cost basis of the property. Individ-
ual buyer-lessors, who generally are near the fifty percent federal
tax ceiling, benefit more from a depreciation deduction than do
corporations, whose maximum tax rate is forty-six percent. This
deduction may fully offset rental income during the early years of
the lease as well as provide a tax shelter for other income.20 Sec-
15. Hereinafter, unless otherwise denoted, all section references are to the Internal Reve-
nue Code.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-i(c), T.D. 6935, 1967-2 C.B. 268.
17. When "boot" (cash or other property) is received in addition to the like-kind prop-
erty, gain is recognized up to the amount of the boot received, but not in excess of realized
gain. Realized losses, however, are not recognized when boot is received.
18. A seller-lessee may want to recognize gain in order to take advantage of a net operat-
ing loss carryover that is about to expire. In addition, the investment credit carryover also
may be about to expire.
19. Under § 1245 the amount of gain recaptured at ordinary rates is the full amount of
the depreciation taken. This section applies to tangible personal property. Under § 1250 the
amount of the gain recaptured is the excess of accelerated over straight line depreciation.
This section applies to real estate.
20. Even though the use of accelerated depreciation (sum-of-the-year digits or declining
balance) may reduce the depreciation deduction during the later years of the lease, the time
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ond, if the buyer-lessor is a tax-exempt organization and if the rent
is not "unrelated" business income, the rental income is not taxa-
ble.21 Third, if the purchase price of the property is high and the
asset is financed by a loan or nonrecourse obligation, the buyer-
lessor obtains an interest deduction on the loan. Fourth, if the sub-
ject of the lease is personal property, the investment credit under
section 38 may also be available.
B. Consequences of a Holding that the Arrangement is a Fi-
nancing Arrangement or a Sham
If the transaction is found to be a financing device, there is no
sale by the purported seller-lessee, and therefore neither gain nor
loss is recognized on the transfer.2 2 The purported seller-lessee
consequently is not entitled to a rent deduction, but he may take a
depreciation deduction, the investment tax credit, ordinary and
necessary deductions, interest deductions, and property tax
deductions.
The purported buyer-lessor is now a lender, and that portion of
the payments which does not represent payment of principal is in-
terest income. The lender has no ownership deductions such as de-
preciation. The exercise of the option to purchase by the purported
seller-lessee would be considered a repayment of the loan and
would not result in recognition of gain or loss.
If found to be a sham, the transaction is treated for tax purposes
as though it never occurred.
PART II
This section discusses the major financing/sale-leaseback cases
in chronological order, beginning with cases that found the trans-
actions to be financing devices, followed by cases that found a
valid sale-leaseback, and ending with cases that require special
value of money makes it beneficial for the lessor to take the greater deduction in the earlier
years.
21. Section 511 provides that taxable income of tax-exempt organizations includes a per-
centage of the total rents received from "business leases" equal to the ratio of business lease
indebtedness to the adjusted basis of the property. 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.514(a)-l(a)(1)(iv)
(1958).
22. For an additional description of the effects of a financing arrangement, see Rev. Rul.
72-543, 72-2 C.B. 87.
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scrutiny because nonrecourse financing was involved.
A. Financing Cases
1. The Early Cases
Three early cases, Commissioner v. H.F Neighbors Realty, Co.,23
John Shillito Co. v. United States,24 and Helvering v. F & R Laza-
rus & Co., 25 contain very brief opinions and, except for Neighbors,
provide little useful analysis. In all three cases, the taxpayer trans-
ferred legal title to land and buildings to a trust company for a
price substantially less than the property's fair market value.26 The
trust company contemporaneously leased, on a "net" lease basis,
the property back to the taxpayer for ninety-nine years27 and is-
sued trust certificates to investors to obtain the necessary proceeds
for the purchase. The rent was passed on to the certificate holders
as a percentage return on their investments.28 The certificates
could be redeemed by the seller-lessee, and title to the property
would then be returned to the seller.
In Shillito and Lazarus the issue was whether the lessor had
made a capital investment in the property that warranted a depre-
ciation deduction. In Neighbors the issue was whether there was a
gain to the lessee on the sale and leaseback. In all three cases the
test used was the intent of the parties as evidenced by all the sur-
rounding circumstances.29
23. 81 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1936).
24. 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9712 (S.D. Ohio 1942).
25. 308 U.S. 252 (1939), af'g 101 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1939).
26. In Neighbors, the sale price was $936,104 and the appraised value was $2,000,000. 81
F.2d at 174. In Shillito, the selling price was $1,400,000 and the fair market value was
$2,093,000. 42-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) at 10,684. In Lazarus, the sale price was $3,250,000
and the appraised value was $6,500,000. 308 U.S. at 253.
27. In Neighbors, 81 F.2d at 174, and Shillito, 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 10,684, the
lease was "renewable forever."
28. The certificate holders had a 5.5% return in Neighbors, 81 F.2d at 174, a 5% return
in Lazarus, 308 U.S. at 253, and a 6% return in Shillito, 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at
10,684.
29. The court in Neighbors looked at "the original intention of the parties" as evidenced
by the documents and "extraneous evidence." 81 F.2d at 175. Shillito states the "plaintiff
did not intend to sell said property but to borrow money on the security of said real estate."
42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 10,685. The court in Lazarus found that "the 'rent' stipulated
in the 'lease' back was intended as a promise to pay interest on the loan; and the
'depreciation fund' required by the 'lease' was intended as an amortization fund, designed to
1982] 393
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In finding that the transactions were financing devices and not
sale-leasebacks, only the Neighbors opinion provides useful analy-
sis. Discounting the absence of any promise to repay the debt, any
express personal obligation, or definite maturity date, the court in
Neighbors pointed to five key factors: (1) inadequate consideration
for the "sale"; (2) the provision for redemption or reconveyance
was likely to be exercised because the fair market value of the
property was $2,000,000 and the "debt" was half that amount; (3)
the transferor's continued posssession and management of the
property; (4) the transferor's payment of taxes and assessments;
and (5) the transferor's receipt and use of the rents and profits of
the property.30 Also, existence of a debt was indicated because the
taxpayer was obligated to maintain his financial position and not
to sell his remaining property for less than a stipulated amount.31
2. Rent Deduction Cases
The intent test was followed in Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United
States.32 Frito-Lay originally planned to construct a plant on a site
that it owned, but ran into financial difficulties. Frito-Lay then
transferred the site to a newly-formed subsidiary which in turn ex-
changed the title to the land for a $49,824 non-interest bearing
note of Jones, who leased the land back to the subsidiary for
twenty years. Jones agreed to construct a $1,579,910 plant on the
land, with 7.5% of that amount to be paid per year as rent, which
amounted to over 2.3 million dollars total rent over the lease term.
pay off the loan " 308 U.S. at 254.
30. 81 F.2d at 175.
31. Id. Three factors seemed important m Lazarus and Shillito: (1) the need for addi-
tional working capital was the motive behind the transaction; (2) the rent payments over the
lease terms were equal to interest, and, in the case of Lazarus, the depreciation fund was an
amortization fund for payment of principal; and (3) the fair market value of the land and
buildings conveyed greatly exceeded the selling price of the property. In Lazarus, one of
only two sale-leaseback cases to reach the United States Supreme Court, equitable owner-
ship, not legal ownership, was important in determining the substance of the transaction.
Although legal title was transferred to the buyer-lessor, the seller-lessee was the one who
bore "the burden of exhaustion of capital investment." 308 U.S. at 254.
Lazarus also was important for its acknowledgement that substance, rather than form,
would be controlling in characterizing a sale-leaseback transaction for federal income tax
purposes and that the parties' intent is a key factor in this determination. The case, how-
ever, is not particularly helpful in analyzing more complicated sale-leaseback transactions.
32. 209 F Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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At the end of the lease term, the subsidiary had the option to
purchase the property for the original amount of the note. Looking
at the intent of the parties as evidenced by the written agreements,
read in the light of the facts and circumstances at the time the
agreement was executed, the district court upheld the Commis-
sioner's disallowance of the rent deductions taken.33 Although the
court observed that the fact that "the amount payable to Jones
would be a reasonable rental is coincidental to the financing ar-
rangements, '34 the court noted that the option price was negligible
in relation to the total rent paid and that mere cancellation of the
note could cause title to be revested in Frito-Lay. In addition, the
court found that the conduct of the parties indicated an intent to
engage in a financing arrangement.
Paul W Frenzel3 5 followed and cited Frito-Lay Like the parties
in Fnto-Lay, the Frenzels ran into trouble trying to obtain financ-
ing for the construction of a building that they intended to rent to
a third party. They nevertheless commenced construction and con-
veyed the land and building in progress to the First Trust Com-
pany for a sum equal to the total purchase price paid for the land
plus the total cost of construction-$1,038,415. The trust company
leased back the property to the Frenzels for a primary term of ten
years at a rental comprising: (1) an amount sufficient to amortize
the purchase price over a ten year period, plus (2) five percent of
the amortized balance outstanding. The Frenzels paid all operating
expenses, as in a typical net lease arrangement, made substantial
improvements, and retained the option to purchase the property at
the end of the primary term or of any of the three five-year re-
newal periods (when a much lower rent was due) for ten percent of
the purchase price. The lessor had an unqualified right to receive
the rent because the lessee agreed to maintain liability insurance,
to hold the lessor harmless from all claims for injury or damage,
and to pay rent in all events with no abatement or reduction in
case of damage from a casualty or an act of God.
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's finding that the tax-
payers had established an equity in the property under section
33. Id. at 889 (citing Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956)).
34. Id. at 892.
35. 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 63,276 (1963).
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162(a)(3) and that there was merely a financing arrangement. In so
doing, the court adopted the "intention of the parties" test of
Frito-Lay.3 6 Important facts and circumstances were that the tax-
payers retained all the essential rights and risks of ownership "but
gave up bare legal title with a strong string firmly attached in the
form of an option by which they could reinvest themselves with
that title when the property was paid for,"37 had paid all the ex-
penses on the property, had indemnified the trust company for lia-
bility, and would pay the rent even in the case of casualty or de-
struction." A financing arrangement also was indicated because:
(1) the parties tried to obtain financing;, 9 (2) First Trust was not
concerned with permanent possession;40 (3) First Trust treated the
transaction as a mortgage on its books;41 (4) all of First Trust's
expenses, including attorney's fees, were paid by the lessees, as in a
typical financing transaction;42 and (5) the sales price did not re-
flect the fair market value of the property.43
3. Recent Cases
In Miller v. Commissioner,44 a depreciation deduction case, the
Tax Court did not mention the intent of the parties but rather
concentrated on who bore the burden of the capital investment.
The facts were unusual. Wesleyan College wanted to construct two
buildings in accordance with its own plans and specifications. Erie
County Savings Bank was to be the ultimate financer. The inter-
mediary was CDC Corporation (CDC). The college leased land at a
nominal one dollar per year for thirty-five years to CDC, and CDC
immediately leased back the land to the college. CDC borrowed
$870,000 from the bank, and the twenty-five year leaseback agree-
ment provided a rental of $7,000 per month for the first year of the
36. Id. at 1584-85 (quoting Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956)).
37. Id. at 1585. The court found that the expert's estimation of the fair market value of
the property at the time of the exercise of the option was not clearly erroneous despite the
fact the value of one lease was not taken into account.






44. 68 T.C. 767 (1977).
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lease and $9,000 per month for the remaining twenty-four years of
the lease. At the end of twenty-five years both leases would termi-
nate and title to the improvements on the land automatically
would vest in the college. The lease was assigned and deposited
with the lending bank as security for the loan. The bank also re-
quired the college to secure CDC's note with the college's land and
its interest in the prospective buildings, and required financial
statements from the college. The college's monthly payments
under the leaseback equaled the sum of CDC's monthly mortgage
payments to the bank plus $543 per month, which amounted to
.75% of the amount borrowed. The bank required that, in case
CDC defaulted, the bank could obtain the mortgage payments di-
rectly from the college. The college could, if it desired, make a cash
settlement with the bank and reobtain the property using the same
prepayment schedule as CDC's prepayment schedule under the
mortgage note. The college was to pay all maintenace, repairs, in-
surance, utilities, and taxes. In the event of casualty or condemna-
tion, the proceeds were to be used to restore the building, or repay
the note, with any remaining proceeds going to the college.
CDC later incurred financial setbacks, became inactive, and sold
its rights to Dr. O.B. Miller, who was interested in the cash flow of
$543 per month for the remaining twenty-three years of the lease,
for which he paid $49,000. On Miller's insistence that he not be
personally liable on the mortgage note, the bank allowed CDC to
assign to Miller its rights without its obligations because the bank
relied on the value of the real estate and the creditworthiness of
the college. Nevertheless, Miller deducted interest payments on
the mortgage loan and took depreciation on the college buildings.
In looking at the substance of the transaction, the Tax Court
concluded that the college, not CDC or Miller, had borrowed
money and made capital investments. Miller purchased CDC's
right to receive the monthly $543 fee, not the ownership of two
college buildings subject to a mortgage. The Tax Court pointed out
that CDC, which supposedly borrowed $870,000 from the bank,
had a capitalization of only $18,000 in shareholders' equity and
$39,000 in loans and, before the loan from the bank was granted,
had a net operating deficit of $20,721.41 The Tax Court found that
45. Id. at 777.
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the burden of the capital investment was on the college: it secured
CDC's note; the thirty-five year ground lease ended when the
leaseback agreement ended; the college's repayment privileges were
identical to those of CDC; at the termination of the leaseback the
college automatically acquired title without any additional pay-
ment; all taxes, assessments, insurance, etc., were paid by the col-
lege; and insurance or condemnation proceeds were to be used to
reconstruct the buildings. The college, not CDC, had the capital
investment, and "CDC, and hence Dr. Miller, acted merely as a
conduit between [the] college and [the] bank."' Thus, Miller was
not entitled to the depreciation deduction.
In Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner47 and Cynthia Schaefer,4 the
two most recent financing cases, the issue was the rent deduction,
although Schaefer also involved the depreciation deduction. In
both cases the primary test used was that of burdens and benefits,
not the intent of the parties.
Sun Oil concentrated on whether the burdens and benefits on
the buyer-lessor and the seller-lessee reflected the traditional bar-
gained-for business relationship between owner and lessee.49 In
that case, Sun Oil sold 320 parcels of unimproved service station
sites at cost to General Electric Pension Trust, a tax-exempt trust.
Sun Oil simultaneously leased each location from the trust for
twenty-five years with lease renewal option rights for an additional
sixty-five years.
The court concluded that the following burdens on and benefits
to the lessee indicated a financing arrangement rather than a valid
sale-leaseback:
(1) The rent was geared to amortize the moneys advanced by
the Trust at an agreed annual rate of 4% % over the pri-
mary twenty-five year term.50 The court concluded that
this rate was not equivalent to fair rental value, but was
consistent with the going market interest rate for quality
46. Id. at 778.
47. 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
48. 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,440 (1980).
49. 562 F.2d at 263.
50. Id. at 266.
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firms such as Sun Oil.1
(2) Sun Oil bore the tax, maintenance, and annual operating
expenses. There was to be no abatement of rent even in
case of condemnation or casualty. The lessor had no obli-
gation for expenditures in connection with the leased
premises. Sun Oil agreed to indemnify the lessor and
hold it harmless from any liability arising from use and
occupancy The court concluded that "[t]hrusting all of
such burdens and risks on the lessee under every condi-
tion and circumstance. . is hardly consistent with cus-
tomary substantive bargains in the market place between
lessors and lessees. '52
(3) The lessee could make a rejectable offer to the lessor to
repurchase if the property were condemned, seized by
eminent domain, or in the lessee's sole judgment the
leased site were no longer profitable or necessary to its
business.55 The lessee had the option to substitute other
real property of equal value, measured by lessee's book
value, in the event of condemnation or decline in profit-
ability of the leased land.54 The court concluded that
these rejectable offer and substitution rights of the lessee
were "benefits characteristic of the ownership of property
rather than [those] of a leasehold."55
(4) The repurchase price in the lease was geared to the un-
amortized principal advanced by the buyer-lessor and
therefore was not related to fair market value.58 The
court concluded that the option to acquire the property
at the end of the primary term at the value to the lessor
was a form of "equity" because the value to the lessor
was really the present value of future payments for sixty-
five years at a specified rate.57
51. Id. at 269.
52. Id. at 263.
53. Id. at 263-64.
54. Id. at 263-65.
55. Id. at 265.
56. Id. at 267.
57. Id. at 268.
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In the most recent financing case, Cynthia Schaefer,5 the court
examined the lessee's dominion and control over the property, the
investment of the lessor, and a broad range of burdens and bene-
fits of the parties to deny both rent and depreciation deductions. 59
In this case, a doctor purchased a hotel for $200,000, paid nothing
down, and issued a note for the full amount. The note required
annual principal payments of $10,000. The doctor in turn leased
the property back to the original owner, a good friend of the doc-
tor, who originally had purchased the property for $200,000 four
years prior to this lease arrangement. The lease to the original
owner was on a year-to-year basis with rents guaranteed at $10,000
and the potential of higher rents if the profits from the hotel were
greater.60 The lessee had the option to repurchase the property for
$200,000 and had a right to $40,000 "profit" if the lessor sold the
property to anyone else for $240,000.
The court considered the totality of the following burdens and
benefits as indications that the seller-lessee really remained the
owner of the property:
(1) The lessee had "unbridled discretion" to sublet the prop-
erty, thus permitting hin to continue to operate the
property in the same manner as before the sale-
leaseback; 1
(2) the lessee continued to be liable on the note given when
the property was first purchased; 2
(3) the lessee agreed to pay real estate taxes and fire insur-
ance premiums, and to hold the lessor harmless from lia-
bility arising out of the operation of the premises;es
(4) the lessee bore all the risks of current operating losses;'
(5) the lessor could not reasonably expect to receive more
58. 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,440 (1980).
59. This is an unusual case because both rent and depreciation deductions were at issue.
60. The leaseback agreement provided that the lessor receive the first $10,000 in profits
from the notes, the lessee the next $10,000, with the parties splitting any net profits over
$20,000. Id. at 1912.






than the $10,000 guaranteed annual lease payment;65
(6) the lessor was shielded from any long-run downside risks
due to the "put option" to resell to the lessee;66
(7) the lessor was unlikely to benefit from any long-range ap-
preciation of the property because (a) the lessor did not
contemplate retaining the property for appreciation pur-
poses if the lessee found a buyer, (b) the lessee retained
the right to all profits on the sale of the property up to
$240,000,67 (c) the lessee held the recorded title to the
property and therefore held veto power over the lessor as
to any possible sale, 8 and (d) the lessee could virtually
force the lessor to reconvey the property simply by termi-
nating his role as lessee under the leaseback agreement.6
Control of the premises constituted a very important benefit to
the lessee. The control was evidenced by the lessee's initiative in
granting an option to the sublessees to purchase the hotel without
the approval of the lessor. Furthermore, the lessee, in the sublease
agreement, reduced the lessor's interest in the hotel's operating in-
come without the lessor's approval.70
The court also examined whether the lessor had any investment
in the property The court observed that the lessor made no initial
payment to purchase the property, that the $10,000 lease payments
received were offset by the $10,000 principal installment required
of the lessor under the agreement, and that the lessor had "put" an
option to sell the property to the lessee for the original purchase
price with the lessee receiving cash for the amount of the equity.1
The court concluded that the lessor had made no real economic
investment in the hotel property: "it is not coincidental that the
net inflow due [the lessee] under the agreement . approximates
the amount required to be paid by" the lessee to the former owner






69. Id. at 1917.
70. Id. at 1915.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1917.
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From these financing cases, one can conclude that the courts
have no systematic approach to the sale-leaseback problem. Al-
though the rent deduction cases concentrate on the equity interest
of the lessee and the depreciation deduction cases concentrate on
the capital investment of the lessor, the cases evince a varying em-
phasis on the intent of the parties, the burdens and benefits cre-
ated by the lease arrangement, and the fair market value of the
payments under the sale-leaseback arrangement. Although the
facts of each case differ and the general tests of each case vary,
many of the same factors are repeated in the courts' analyses. Yet,
no relative weights or ranking of importance are given to these nu-
merous factors.
B. Sale-Leaseback Cases
Most of the valid sale-leaseback cases are recent. Like the recent
financing cases, they involve complicated fact patterns and varying
tests. Both Keeling v. Commissione7 3 and American Realty Trust
v. United States7 4 use an intent test, concentrating on economic
compulsion to exercise the option. The United States Supreme
Court in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,5 on the other hand,
uses a multiple factor approach, citing more than thirty factors in
reaching its decision. Finally, in Belz Investment Co. v. Commis-
stoner,7 6 the court adopts a test using the parties' intent, the eco-
nomic substance of the transaction, and the status of the parties.
1. Keeling v Commissioner
In Keeling v. Commissioner, real and personal property belong-
ing to a company owned in part by the taxpayer and in part by the
taxpayer's associate, Mosher, was sold for $141,000.47 and leased
back for $2,200 rent per year. The lease was for a term of five years
with an option to purchase the property for $71,701 at the end of
the term. Approximately half of the annual rent was to be placed
in an escrow account bearing four percent interest and applied to
the option purchase price. The lessee was liable for fire, casualty
73. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 954 (1971).
74. 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
75. 435 U.S. 561 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
76. 72 T.C. 1209 (1979).
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and life insurance, and taxes. In addition, the lessee could sublease
the property
The Commissioner contended that the transaction was a financ-
ng arrangement. He argued that the taxpayer-lessee had an equity
interest in the property because a portion of the rent was applied
to the option price, and the option price was below the fair market
value of the property, determined by an expert to be $101,000.Y In
addition, the Commissioner argued that the lease agreement im-
posed many of the rights, risks, and responsibilities on the lessee
that normally attach to a purchaser of property.7 8 The court dis-
agreed with each of the Commissioner's arguments. The court
stated that mere application of the rent to the option price did not
create an equitable interest in the taxpayer and that no equitable
interest arose from the payment of the $71,000 option price be-
cause the taxpayer's financial condition was so meager that there
would be no "compulsion to exercise" the option. 9 In addition, the
court decided that the existence of these risks and responsibilities
was "mere surplusage" in determining if in fact a sale or a lease
existed.80 Overall, the court found significant the fact that the ne-
gotiation to sell the property was intended to solve Mosher's im-
mediate cash needs, not the taxpayer's needs, and that the option
to purchase was added as an afterthought. Thus, the court con-
cluded, the parties did not intend a financing arrangement.81
2. American Realty Trust v United States
Another case in which both the intent of the parties and eco-
nomic compulsion were considered m determining a valid sale-
leaseback was American Realty Trust v. United States.8 2 In this
case, American Realty Trust (ART) entered into an agreement
with Helmsley, a real estate entrepreneur, whereby Helmsley
transferred to ART for $7,000,000 a resort property in Palm Beach.
The selling price consisted of a cash down payment of $2,500,000





82. 498 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1974).
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and the balance of $4,500,000 due through a mortgage loan ar-
rangement. ART agreed to lease the property on a "net" lease ba-
sis to Palm Beach Towers, Helmsley's wholly-owned corporation,
with certain provisions under the lease to be undertaken or guar-
anteed by Helmsley personally The provisions of the lease ar-
rangement included the following: (1) a rental term of twenty-one
years with two successive twenty-five year renewal options; (2) a
net rental to average $645,000 per year; (3) a rental rate to be re-
duced by fifty percent of any diminution in the annual mortgage
payments; (4) the seller-lessee was to bear the burden of capital
improvements; (5) the seller was granted options to repurchase m
the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh years of the lease for prices
declining to $6,190,000 in the last year; and (6) any condemnation
award for the property was to be applied to the mortgage to the
extent of the outstanding principal balance, to the landlord up to
$2,525,000, and to the tenant up to the value of its leasehold es-
tate, with the remainder to be shared by the landlord (sixty per-
cent) and the tenant (forty percent).
Helmsley exercised the option in the seventh year because of the
sudden availability of "wrap-around" financing that allowed him,
through his corporation, to acquire title to the property with little
cash outlay of his own. Until the option was exercised, ART took
depreciation on the property The Commissioner denied those de-
ductions claiming the arrangement was a mere financing arrange-
ment. The government argued that the "burdens and benefits"
were with Helmsley, the rents were equal to interest, and there was
economic compulsion for the lessee to exercise the option." The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming the district
court, held the transaction to be a valid sale-leaseback and not
merely a tax avoidance device. The court found that Helmsley was
not under any economic compulsion to exercise the repurchase op-
tion but that he decided to exercise his option merely because of
the sudden availability of wrap-around financing.8" Also of impor-
tance was testimony that the agreed-upon purchase price of
$7,000,000 was "fair" and not unduly low.85 The court stated:





"merely because tax planning may have preceded a transaction, or
because tax savings have flowed from it, we are not constrained to
characterize the entire event as primarily, or even substantially, a
tax avoidance device."86 The court distinguished Lazarus on the
basis that Helimsley's lease was for an initial term of only twenty-
one years, whereas the lease in Lazarus ran for ninety-nine years. 8
3. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States8 was the only sale-leaseback
case other than Lazarus to reach the Supreme Court. In Lyon,
Worthen, a bank, was unable because of banking restrictions to
obtain financing for the construction of a bank building. Worthen
then contracted with Lyon, a closely held corporation in the busi-
ness of distributing home furnishings, to lease its land, sell its
building, and lease the building back for twenty-five years plus
eight additional five-year terms. Lyon was to be paid rent in an
amount equal to the principal and interest payments that would
amortize the $7,140,000 mortgage loan it had received from New
York Life, a third party mortgagee, over the twenty-five year pri-
mary period. Worthen also had the option to repurchase the build-
ing at four different times at a price equal to the sum of the un-
paid balance of the mortgage plus Lyon's $500,000 investment
($7,640,000 selling price less the $7,140,000 mortgage) and-six per-
cent interest compounded on Lyon's investment.
The Commissioner determined that for tax purposes Lyon was
not the owner of the building and therefore was not entitled to the
depreciation deduction or the interest deduction. The district
court held in favor of Lyon, but the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court reversed. In
applying a multiple factor approach to determine the economic
substance of the transaction, the Court held the following factors
significant:




88. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
89. Id. at 575.
1982] 405
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:385
(2) the fact that the lessor was exclusively liable on the note
held by this independent mortgagee;9
(3) the nonfamily, nonprivate, arms-length nature of the en-
tire transaction;91
(4) the fact that the transaction was shaped by features
other than tax avoidance-diversification in the case of
Lyon and the legal requirements of the lessee to sell and
lease back the property;92
(5) the fact that the option prices and rents were
reasonable;93
(6) the fact that Lyon's investment of $500,000 was
substantial;9 4
(7) the fact that Lyon could sell the property at a profit at
any time and obtain the benefit of future appreciation;9
5
(8) the fact that Lyon bore certain risks from the transac-
tion;98 and
(9) the fact that the government would receive the same
amount of revenue no matter how the transaction was
viewed.97
90. Id. at 576-77.
91. Id. at 583. Related factors included: (a) "Lyon's substantiality and its independence
from Worthen"; (b) "the competitiveness of the bidding"; (c) "the bona fide character of the
negotiations"; (d) "the presence of several finance organizations seriously interested in par-
ticipating in the transaction" and "the submission of formal proposals by several of those
organizations"; and (e) "the absence of any understanding between Lyon and Worthen that
Worthen would exercise any of its options to extend." Id. at 582-83.
92. Related factors included: (a) the "competive situation" between Worthen and another
bank; (b) the "undercapitalization" of Worthen; and (c) the fact Lyon was not "engaged
generally in the business of financing." Id. at 582-83.
93. Id. at 582. The court also mentioned "the substantiality of the purchase price." Id.
94. Id. at 579.
95. Id. at 583.
96. Id. Related factors included: (a) "the presence of all building depreciation risks on
Lyon"; (b) the risk "that Worthen might default or fail, as other banks have failed"; (c) "the
fact that Worthen could 'walk away' from the relationship at the end of the 25-year primary
term, and probably would do so if the option price were more than the then-current worth
of the building to Worthen"; and (d) "Lyon's liability for the substantial ground rent if
Worthen decides not to exercise any of its options to extend." Id.
97. Id. at 580. Factors (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) are considered important by the IRS Audit
Manual, "Equipment Leasing Tax Shelter" (CCH) ch. 800, 1 844.
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4. Belz Investment Co. v Commissioner
The most recent valid sale-leaseback case, Belz Investment Co.
v. Commissioner,98 adopted a test that examines the parties' in-
tent, the economic substance of the transaction, and the status of
the parties. In this case, Belz Investment Company filed consoli-
dated corporation income tax returns with five subsidiar-
les-among them Expressway Motel Corporation. Expressway con-
tracted with Holiday Inn to construct a motel for Expressway.
Prior to completion of the motel, Expressway became dissatisfied
with time delays and with the quality of the workmanship, so Ex-
pressway agreed to sell the motel to and simultaneously lease it
back from Holiday Inn. The agreement conveyed the right, title,
and interest in the property" to Holiday Inn for $1,502,000, of
which approximately $35,000 represented a profit for Expressway.
The lease agreement required Expressway to pay Holiday Inn an-
nual rent in the amount of twenty-five percent of gross room rent-
als and five percent of gross annual restaurant and bar beverage
revenue. The lease term ran for twenty years, and Expressway had
the right to renew the agreement on the same terms and conditions
for three additional ten-year terms. Expressway had to maintain
the premises and pay all charges for utilities, taxes, and assess-
ments. In addition, Expressway had to provide and keep in force
insurance on the property Expressway had certain rights to insur-
ance and condemnation proceeds in excess of the payments on the
outstanding mortgage. Expressway possessed an option to
purchase the property after ten years for $1,502,000 reduced by the
excess, if any, of the gross rental payments made over the sum of
$1,438,000. Also, the obligations under the first mortgage were to
be assumed by Expressway with a corresponding credit against the
adjusted purchase price.
The issue was whether Expressway's payments were in substance
"rent" or "equity" Petitioner asserted that the amounts were
clearly deductible rent because: (1) Expressway did not take title
and had no equity in the property; (2) Expressway had to pay the
amounts in order to continue its use of the property; (3) the rent-
98. 72 T.C. 1209 (1979).
99. The property included the motel itself, Expressway's rights under the ground lease,
and the land adjacent to the ground lease which Expressway owned.
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als and option prices were reasonable; and (4) Expressway and
Holiday Inn negotiated at arms-length with no understanding that
Expressway would exercise the option.100 The Commissioner ar-
gued that the sale-leaseback was in substance a "secured lending
arrangement" whereby Holiday Inn "loaned" $1,502,000 to Ex-
pressway when Holiday Inn purchased the motel and that Express-
way's exercise of the option was a foregone conclusion. 101
The Tax Court concluded that the parties entered into a bona
fide sale-leaseback arrangement. The court considered the follow-
ing factors in reaching its decision: (1) evidence existed that the
transaction was arms-length, entered into for a valid business pur-
pose, and was not for tax considerations; 102 (2) the exercise of the
option to purchase was not a "foregone" conclusion given the un-
certainty of the rent revenues which were to be applied to the op-
tion price and the arguably fair market value of the option price; 03
(3) the lessor alone was obligated to pay both the ground rent and
the first mortgage on the property;'0 4 (4) the sales price was rea-
sonable; 0 5 and (5) the rent was determined by a percentage
formula without any minimum rental.'0 8
C. Nonrecourse Financing Cases
Nonrecourse financing is common in real estate ventures. An in-
vestor in a real estate venture can leverage his investment through
a nonrecourse loan and claim depreciation and other deductions in
excess of his equity investment. In Crane v. Commissioner,""7 the
Supreme Court ruled that the absence of personal liability with
respect to a mortgage did not prevent its inclusion in the deprecia-
tion basis of the property Real estate tax shelters, unlike other tax
shelters, are not subject to any statutory provisions limiting the
amount of the deductions to the amount of the "at risk"
100. 72 T.C. at 1224.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1226
103. Id. at 1228.
104. Id. at 1227.
105. Id. at 1227 n.15.
106. Id. at 1228.




The first sale-leaseback case involving nonrecourse financing was
David E. Bolger,' 9 in which the taxpayer purchased through straw
corporations several pieces of property which the taxpayer then
leased back on a net lease basis to the seller. The purchase price
was fully financed through an institutional lender on a nonrecourse
basis. The lender received rent directly from the seller-lessee. The
rent at least equaled the debt service obligation, but was never sig-
nificantly greater than the debt service. The issue in the case was
whether the taxpayer-investor was entitled to a depreciation de-
duction on the property under section 167.
The Internal Revenue Service stipulated that the fair market
value of each piece of property, taking into account the existing
lease, was at least equal to the mortgage on the property.110 There-
fore, the IRS could argue only that it was unreasonable to assume
that a capital investment would eventually occur despite the ab-
sence of any personal liability. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer
might abandon the property because the cash flow was minimal
and the property was mortgaged to the full extent of its value. The
Tax Court rejected this argument, concluding that the taxpayer
was building equity m the property and could expect the property
to appreciate. Thus, the lessor would suffer a substantial forfeiture
upon abandonment.""
It seems rather clear that if the facts of Bolger were repeated
today the result would be different. The court in Hilton v. Com-
missioner1 2 criticized the Commissioner in Bolger for "blithely
abandon[ing] ship" and not examining the "efficaciousness of the
lease." L3 The Bolger case is important, however, for developing the
test followed in all subsequent nonrecourse sale-leaseback cases:
whether the lessor stands to lose anything by abandoning the
transaction. If the lessor would lose nothing from abandoning the
transaction, the lessor is not the owner of the property entitled to
108. I.R.C. § 465.
109. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
110. Id. at 765.
111. Id. at 770-71.
112. 74 T.C. 305 (1980).
113. Id. at 349.
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the depreciation deduction.114
This "abandonment" test was used in Estate of Franklin v.
Commissiner,1 1 5 in which a tax shelter was set up for several doc-
tors, one of whom was Franklin. In that case the Romneys agreed
to sell the Thunderbird Inn to the Associates, a California limited
partnership of which Franklin and several other doctors were lim-
ited partners. Although the property's worth was about $800,000,
the selling price was $1,224,000, payable over a ten year period,
with interest on any unpaid balance of 7.5% per annum. The
purchase obligation was nonrecourse. The only money paid down
was a $75,000 prepaid interest charge. At the end of the tenth year,
the Associates could make a balloon payment of the difference be-
tween the remaining purchase price, forecast at $975,000, and any
mortgage then outstanding against the property. The monthly pay-
ments approximately equaled the rent from the seller who leased
the property back from the Associates. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the taxpayer-investor did
not acquire an equity interest in the property entitling him to the
depreciation deduction because he failed to demonstrate that the
purchase price was at least approximately equivalent to the fair
market value of the property 116 Such a demonstration would
"rather quickly yield an equity in the property which the pur-
chaser could not prudently abandon. '117 Because the unpaid bal-
ance of the purchase price exceeded the fair market value of the
property, the buyer-lessor had only a "mere chance" to benefit
from appreciation in the property and could abandon the arrange-
ment at any time.118
The "abandonment" test also was applied in Hilton v. Commis-
swner.1 9 There, a newly constructed department store was sold by
Broadway to a single purpose financing corporation and leased
back under a long-term net lease. The financing company then
conveyed its interest in the property to a general partnership
which in turn conveyed portions of its interest to a number of tiers
114. Id. at 364.
115. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), af'g 64 T.C. 752 (1975).
116. Id. at 1048.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 74 T.C. at 350.
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of limited partners. The selling price of the property was
$3,137,500, even though Broadway incurred direct and indirect
costs in the acquisition and construction of the store totaling
$3,332,834. The lease term was thirty years with an option to ex-
tend for another sixty-eight years. The rentals were $198,603.75 or
6.33% of the purchase price for the initial term, $47,062.50 or
1.5% of the purchase price for the first renewal term of twenty-
three years, and $31,375 or one percent of the purchase price for
the second and third renewal periods. A ten percent balloon pay-
ment was due at the end of the initial thirty-year term. Broadway
had the right to purchase the property if the lessor decided to sell
for $50,000, subject to the Indenture and Assignment of Lease and
Agreement.120 The limited partners of one partnership put up
$180,000, all of which went to the general partner and lawyer for
services rendered. The limited partners of the other partnership
put up $155,000 cash. This amount also went to pay commissions.
The court concluded that the limited partners as buyer-lessors
"would not at any time find it imprudent from an economic point
of view to abandon the property" because "[t]he low rents and al-
most nominal cash flow leave little room for doubt that, apart from
tax benefits, the value of the interest acquired by the petitioners is
substantially less than the amount they paid for it." '121 In reaching
this conclusion the court relied substantially on expert testinony.
One expert tried to show that the lessor-investors were the owners
of the property by calculating the residual value of the property at
three lease renewal dates in the future. The expert assumed the
residual value of the property would equal the purchase price of
$3,150,000 at the end of thirty years, fifty-three years, and seventy-
six years, but made no serious investigation to ascertain the mar-
ket value of the property 1 22 The expert justified his statement re-
120. Because the financing corporation's capitalization was only $1,000, it planned to sell
its corporate notes to certain insurance company lenders. The corporate notes were secured
by an indenture of mortgage and deed of trust, which conveyed the financing corporation's
interest in the property to the trustees for the insurance companies, and by assignment of
the lease and the rentals to the trustee. The rentals flowed directly to the insurance compa-
nies from Broadway. The interest rate of 5.125% shared by the insurance companies on the
mortgage notes was tied to the credit rating of Broadway-commonly known as a bond type
lease. Id. at 324-25.
121. Id. at 360.
122. Id. at 351.
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garding residual value by pointing out that the assessed value of
the land, $812,690, if it appreciated at 4.7% per year, would result
in a land value alone of $3,150,000 in thirty years.12 s The court
disregarded the expert's opinion, however, because the appraised
value of the property did not reflect fair market value.
The court found the testimony of the IRS's real estate expert
more persuasive. His testimony, unlike that of the other expert,
was based on a thorough investigation of the property and the de-
tails of the actual transaction. The IRS expert familiarized himself
with the physical aspects of the property, the neighborhood, and
the city, and examined the construction and the potential obsoles-
cence of the property. His testimony focused on the economic gain
to the buyer-lessors in the absence of any tax advantages. He ex-
amined two types of economic gain: (1) net income or loss, i.e.,
cash flow; and (2) net proceeds resulting from sale, condemnation,
and mortgage financing. He assumed that the lessee probably
would exercise its right to extend the lease through the first option
period because the lessee was expected to occupy the premises
"through the normal life expectancy of the viability of the market
area the store was designed to serve."124 For various cogent and
well-supported reasons, the expert did not consider possible re-
turns beyond the first option period. 25
As to cash flows, the IRS expert noted that the lease rental pay-
ments amortized ninety percent of the principal amount of the
mortgage notes, leaving a balloon payment of $313,750 remaining
due at the end of the loan period. He assumed refinancing at the
end of the initial term of the lease at the original mortgage rate
and concluded that the lessors would receive only $23,000 per year
of pre-tax flow. 26 He concluded that the present value of this in-
come thirty years in the future would not justify the $334,000 orig-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 354.
125. This was "due to the highly speculative nature of any predictions concerning the
future of the property, and the fact that the value of the economic returns produced by an
extension of the lease past 2021 would be relatively small on a discounted basis." Id. at 355.
126. Id. at 356. The expert pointed out that at the end of the initial lease, the taxpayers
had the option of making capital contributions to cover the balloon payment or refinancing
the balloon. Refinancing was assumed in light of the rent provision in the lease for subse-
quent option periods and the probability that the lessee would continue its occupancy for
the first renewal period.
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inal investment by the lessors and that therefore no economic gain
would result during that period.
As to possible economic gain on sale, the IRS expert determined
that the lessors would suffer a loss because the lessee could
purchase the lessor's interest for $50,000. Disregarding the option,
the expert stated that the lessor's "opportunity for gain on any
sale will be limited to any then-present value of the rental income
flow and the residual, the combined total of which. . . is minimal
and in any event less than [the lessor's] investment."12 7 The court
concluded that, because the lease gave the lessee authority to sub-
let the property or to assign its leasehold interest after the original
term of the lease, the lessee had virtually total control of the prop-
erty even if the property were sold.12 8
The IRS expert also suggested that economic gain might result
from condemnation, but that because the "act of condemnation
lies wholly beyond the control of the owner or the lessee of prop-
erty, and since the amounts of awards cannot even be speculated
in advance," the gain is not a factor which a prospective investor
would look to in investing in the property.129
Finally, the IRS expert concluded that there was no economic
gain from repayment of the mortgage notes because gain would re-
sult only if there was a substantial decrease in the original interest
rate of 5.125%-an unlikely event given the fact that the original
rate was below the prevailing commercial lending rate and interest
rates were escalating.130
A case with facts very similar to those of Estate of Franklin was
David L. Narver, Jr.,11 in which the court decided that the lessors
had no investment in the leased property because they "would
have nothing to lose by abandoning the transaction."3 2 In Narver,
127. Id. at 357-58. At the trial, the taxpayers attempted to establish that the $50,000
purchase option had been amended to vest in the lessee the right to veto any proposed
purchase by buyers who were competitors of the lessee or who did not have the lessee's
credit standing. The court, like the fact finders below, rejected the taxpayer's testimony.
Yet, the court proceeded to analyze the economics as if this amendment had occurred. Id. at
357.
128. Id. at 357-58.
129. Id. at 358.
130. Id. at 359.
131. 75 T.C. 53 (1980).
132. Id. at 101.
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a corporation sold a building to two limited partnerships which im-
mediately leased the property back to the corporation's wholly
owned subsidiary The purchase price was fixed at $1,800,000 with
an initial payment to the seller of $180,000 as prepaid interest.
Seven percent interest was to be paid on the unpaid balance of the
purchase price, which was to be amortized over a twenty-year pe-
riod. The indebtedness was nonrecourse. Under the purchase
agreement, the buyers were to pay taxes and insurance, with the
corporate seller entitled to sell upon the buyers' default on these
payments.13sThe term of the lease was ten years with an option in
the lessee to renew the lease for eight five-year periods. Rent was
$1,000 per month during the initial term and $1,000 per month
plus a cost of living adjustment for the renewal periods. The les-
sees had the right to purchase the building site at the end of the
ten year lease at a price set by appraisers, but in no case less than
$200,000. The sublease from the lessees to the wholly owned sub-
sidiary contained the same terms as the lease except that the part-
nerships did not assign their options to purchase the building or
extend the lease beyond the ten years.
A key factor in the court's analysis in Narver was the fair mar-
ket value of the property, established by experts to be $412,000.13'
In addition, "the absence of multiparty arm's-length dealing, and
the circumstances surrounding payments under the net lease on
the partnerships' nonrecourse indebtedness," led the court to con-
clude that "the transaction in issue lacked from the outset the sub-
stance necessary to justify treating it as a sale."113 5 The court also
did not consider the transaction to be a financing device. Because
the "partnerships were not personally liable for the purchase price,
there was only a mere chance that a genuine debt obligation would
arise at some future time when the partnerships' obligation under
the agreement of purchase would be reduced to a figure more in
line with the building's fair market value. 136 Thus, the seller in
fact advanced no money to the limited partners, nor had the part-
nerships secured the use of forbearance of money under the
133. Id. at 65.
134. There was extensive discussion of expert opinion on valuing the property. Id. at 90-
98.
135. Id. at 99-100.




In contrast to Estate of Franklin, Hilton, and Narver is Dunlap
v. Commissiner,8 in which the court found a valid sale-lease-
back. There, Safeway Stores, Inc. sold for $8,800,000 a warehouse
distribution center to El Paso Properties, a single purpose financ-
ing corporation. El Paso in turn transferred title to the property to
certain investors, one of whom was Dunlap. Simultaneously with
the sale, the property was leased back to Safeway for twenty-five
years under the terms of a net lease. Safeway had the option to
extend the term of the lease for six additional five-year terms at an
annual rent of $264,000. There was no purchase option upon the
expiration of the sixth renewal term. Safeway retained, however,
the right to purchase the property after the tenth year of the origi-
nal term for an amount equal to the discounted present value of
the rent payable during the lease term. El Paso financed $8,413,000
of the purchase price by placing its secured notes with institutional
investors. These notes were secured by an indenture of mortgage
and deed of trust, and by an assignment of the Safeway lease and
the rentals therefrom. The investors were not liable personally on
these notes. The remainder of the purchase price was financed by
the individual mvestors. 13 9 The rent payable under the net lease,
$761,507 annually, was sufficient to repay the mortgage with inter-
est during the original twenty-five year term.
The Commissioner first contended that the sale-leaseback trans-
action was a two-party financing arrangement between the seller
and the institutional investor similar to the arrangement in Laza-
rus. The taxpayers, on the other hand, argued that the transaction
was a bona fide three-party transaction similar to the arrangement
in Lyon. The Commissioner argued that to have a bona fide three-
party transaction, the taxpayer-lessor must assume personal liabil-
ity on the loan. Furthermore, he contended that a two-party trans-
action was evidenced by the fact that: (1) the institutional inves-
tors would not carry the secured notes in the event Safeway
terminated the lease agreement by. purchase of the distribution
137. Id.
138. 74 T.C. 1377 (1980).
139. Id. at 1405. Dunlap made a $116,000 cash payment which was transferred totally to
Safeway. None of the money went to the promotors of the tax shelter.
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center; (2) Safeway had to furnish the institutional investors with
financial statements; and (3) the rent paid under the initial lease
term approximated the principal and interest due under the se-
cured loan. The court disagreed with the Commissioner's conten-
tions. The court stated, as it had in Hilton,140 that personal liabil-
ity was a "neutral factor" in determining the substance of the
transaction.14 Also neutral was the fact that the rent was geared to
the cost of interest and mortgage amortization. The court deter-
mined that if Safeway terminated the lease agreement, the inves-
tors would pay off the mortgage because the purchase price was set
at an amount approximating the remaining balance on the mort-
gage and the property was subject to a lien as long as the mortgage
was not paid off.142 Thus, the court found no merit in the Commis-
sioner's assertion as to the investor's obligations. Finally, the court
concluded that no evidence existed "as to the use or dependence
placed upon [the financial] statements by the institutional inves-
tors." '4s The court pointed out that El Paso also furnished the in-
stitutional investors with its financial statements and balance
sheets.
The Commissioner's second argument was that the transaction
was a "sham" entered into for the purpose of creating tax losses.
The court rejected this argument on a number of grounds. First,
Dunlap had a legitimate business reason for investing in the prop-
erty.14" Second, Dunlap made a "bona fide investment in the prop-
erty," evidenced by his $116,000 down payment to Safeway rather
than to the tax shelter promoters.145 Third, the possibility existed
that Dunlap would own the property eventually because Safeway
had no option to purchase the property after the sixth renewal
term.1
48
140. Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 363.
141. 74 T.C. at 1435.
142. Id. at 1435-36.
143. Id. at 1436.
144. Id. Dunlap thought the warehouse location was in an expanding area where real es-
tate values would appreciate.





This section presents a decision model intended to assist parties
involved in sale-leaseback transactions. A decision model is a
framework consisting of a series of steps, each involving one or
more considerations to be used m making a decision. This model
uses only factors discussed in the court cases analyzed m Part II.
At some places m the model no cases are available to illustrate
specific points making it necessary to devise hypothetical situa-
tions. Following the decision model gives results consistent with
the outcomes of the courts' decisions.
Although the model relates to sale-leaseback transactions, it also
is useful in cases without a leaseback of property, e.g., a lease with
an option to purchase. It does not apply, however, to trust-
leasebacks, gift-leasebacks, and leasebacks involving related
parties.147
Step I: Financial Institutins as Parties to the Transactin
For purposes of this step, a financial institution is a bank, sav-
ings and loan association, trust company, sales finance company,
insurance company, or any other institution engaged in financing
arrangements on an on-going basis.148
1. Is the Buyer-Lessor a Financial Institution?
Generally, when a financial institution is the buyer-lessor in a
147. See note 5 supra.
148. In many of the early sale-leaseback cases financial institutions were direct parties to
the transaction, usually serving as the buyer-lessor. In later cases financial institutions, al-
though not direct lessees or lessors, nonetheless were involved as third parties. They pro-
vided funds to the buyer-lessor to enable him to purchase the property. The sale-leaseback
cases fail to articulate clearly the difference between two- and three-party transactions
which involve financial institutions. The Supreme Court in Lyon recognized the important
distinction between these two types of situations and distinguished the earlier Supreme
Court case, Lazarus, on the ground that Lazarus involved only two parties-the lessee and
a trust company-whereas Lyon involved three parties-the lessee, lessor, and the indepen-
dent mortgagee. The Court noted that the presence of theindependent mortgagee was what
"significantly distinguishe[d] this case from Lazarus." 435 U.S. at 576. The Court failed,
however, to elaborate on this distinction. After reading the cases in this area, the key factor
in the two-party cases apparently is whether the buyer-lessor is a financial institution and,
in the three-party cases, whether the buyer-lessor is a mere conduit for the loan payments
from the seller-lessee to the third party financial institution.
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sale-leaseback transaction, in either a two- or three-party transac-
tion, a financing arrangement exists. In all sale-leaseback cases
cited in which a financial institution was the buyer-lessor, the
courts found a financing device.1 49 The conduct of the seller-lessee
was particularly pertinent in determining that there was a loan or
mortgage agreement, although the conduct of the buyer-lessor also
was important. The seller-lessee typically needed capital, initiated
the transaction, and merely induced the financial institution to
furnish the funds.150
In one limited circumstance a financing arrangement would not
exist even though the buyer-lessor is a financial institution. This is
when the financial institution acquires the property for its own in-
vestment or business purpose. Because banks often are limited by
state and federal law as to the types and amounts of their invest-
ments,1 51 a valid sale is unlikely when a bank is the buyer-lessor.
Financing companies and trust companies, however, frequently are
under no such restrictions. Thus, to determine whether these insti-
tutions are seeking the property for their own purposes, the courts
should examine closely whether the institution initiates the trans-
149. See notes 23-43 & accompanying text supra.
150. For example, in Paul W Frenzel, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 63,276 (1963), the seller-lessee
tried to obtain 100% financing for the construction of a warehouse but was unable to obtain
even a 75% mortgage loan. The Frenzels, therefore, entered into a sale-leaseback transac-
tion with a trust company. The trust company ignored the essential features of a lease, such
as the sublessee's easement rights. This indicated that the trustee was "not too concerned
with permanent possession." Id. at 1586. In addition, the trust company treated the transac-
tion as a mortgage on its books, and the expenses involved in the transaction were paid by
the buyer-lessor, as was common in a financing deal. All of these actions were typical for
financial institutions in loan situations and indicated a financing device.
In Helvering v. F & R Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939), Commissioner v. H.F Neigh-
bors Realty, 81 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1936), and Shillito v. United States, 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9712 (S.D. Ohio 1942), the buyer-lessors were financial institutions. In all of these
cases, trust certificate devices were used, a device enabling the seller-lessees to obtain capi-
tal for their purposes. In Lazarus, the seller-lessee sought to reduce its current indebtedness
and obtain funds to purchase a stock interest in another department store. Because of the
local taxation of mortgage bonds, the trust certificate device, according to the bank presi-
dent, was the only feasible plan. 101 F.2d at 729. In Neighbors, the company-lessee ap-
proached a trust company for a loan to provide the needed funds for reduction of its indebt-
edness, but the interest rate of six percent was considered too high. 81 F.2d at 173-74. A
trust certificate device was used instead. The Shillito Department Store likewise entered
into a trust arrangement after negotiating with investment bankers "with the view to bor-
rowing money on serial notes." 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 10,684.
151. In particular, banks are regulated as to their real estate acquisitions.
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action, whether the board of directors of the institution approves
the transaction as a purchase of property, how the institution
treats the transaction on its books, and whether the institution
makes an investigation of the property similar to that made by a
potential owner.151
To summarize the decision model thus far: when, in a two- or
three-party transaction, the buyer-lessor is a financial institution
not seeking the property for its own purposes, the conclusion man-
dated is that the transaction constitutes a financing arrange-
ment;153 no further analysis is necessary.
2. Is a Financil Institutin an Indirect Party to the Sale-
Leaseback, and Is the Buyer-Lessor a Mere Conduit for the Loan
Payments from the Seller-Lessee to the Third Party Financial
Institution?
In a sale-leaseback transaction in which a financial institution is
a third party but not the buyer-lessor or the seller-lessee, the
transaction is more difficult to analyze. 1" The buyer-lessor may be
152. No sale-leaseback case cited dealt with a financial institution that sought property
for its own purposes. However, in an option to purchase case, Northwest Acceptance Corp.
v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974), af'g 58 T.C. 836 (1972), a sales finance
company, which usually financed the purchase of equipment by leasing the equipment, was
found not to be engaged in financing when it purchased lease contracts from a company that
was in the business of leasing equipment. The financing company was, in effect, taking over
these leasing agreements and was considered to have stepped into the shoes of the company
as owner of the property. Thus, the transactions at issue in that case were considered valid
leases, not conditional sales, and the lessor was entitled to both the depreciation deduction
and the investment credit.
153. If there is a three-party transaction and the buyer-lessor is a financing institution
not seeking the property as an investment, there will be a financing arrangement. Although
no existing cases deal with this situation, the same analysis as in a two-party transaction
would apply.
When a two- or three-party transaction occurs in which a financial institution is the
seller-lessee, there may or may not be a financing arrangement. For example, no financing
device existed in Lyon when the lessee bank sought to finance the construction of a building
through the sale-leaseback device. In part, this was due to federal and state restrictions
placed upon bank indebtedness. Similarly, in Arkansas Bank & Trust Co. v United States,
224 F Supp. 171 (W.D. Ark. 1963), an option to purchase case, the court considered the
bank restrictions on indebtedness a key factor in its determination that there was a true
lease. Both of these cases also referred to other important factors supporting their decision,
such as reasonableness of payments made under the lease. Therefore, if a financial institu-
tion is the seller-lessee, the courts should proceed with the analysis.
154. Most sale-leaseback cases fall within this category.
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a mere "conduit" for providing loan proceeds from the financial
institution to the seller-lessee and for providing loan payments in
the form of rent from the seller-lessee to the financial institution.
When the buyer is such a conduit a financing arrangement ex-
ists.155 No single factor, however, points conclusively to the exis-
tence of a mere conduit of mortgage payments from a seller-lessee
through a buyer-lessor to a financial institution.156 Steps. Ill
through IX of this decision model give a rank order to the factors
mentioned in the various cases to assist parties in understanding
which factors are more controlling.
To summarize part 2 of Step I of the decision model: the courts
155. Miller v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 767 (1977); see note 44 & accompanying text supra.
Miller best exemplifies the application of this theory. The court found" that the transaction
was a financing arrangement because, inter alia, the lease term coincided with the term of
the loan, the rent payments roughly coincided with the interest and principal payments plus
an additional amount that represented a fee for services in obtaining the loan, the property
was certain to return to the original owner, the financial institution looked to the seller-
lessee and not the buyer-lessor for assurance that the loan payments would be made, and
the lessor's payment indicated no investment in the property. Because all the factors in
Miller are unlikely to apppear together in a single sale-leaseback case, the analysis will be
more difficult in most cases. In addition, it is not clear from Miller which factors are most
important.
In Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980); see note 119 & accompanying text supra, a
case involving nonrecourse financing, the court found a conduit arrangement. There, the
initial lease term coincided with the term of the loan. The rental payments made by the
lessee covered 90% of the principal note represented by the mortgage on the property. At
the end of the initial term of the lease, the seller-lessee had the option of either making
capital contributions to cover a sizeable balloon payment or of refinancing the balloon. The
property could return to the lessee because of a repurchase option. The buyers made no
investment in the property. They put up $110,000 cash of the $3,137,700 purchase price-all
of which went to pay commission fees, and none of it passing to the seller-lessee. The "deal"
was packaged by a law firm as a financing transaction and was not negotiated at arm's
length. In fact, it became effective only after the original seller-lessee negotiated and
financed the lease arrangement. Unlike Miller, in which it was obvious from all the circum-
stances that CDC was a mere conduit for the loan payments, in Hilton the testimony of two
experts had to be examined to determine the true nature of the transaction. In a case like
Hilton, the court should proceed with the analysis because most of the factors considered
important in that case are referred to in subsequent steps of the decision model.
156. For example, in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); see notes 88-
97 & accompanying text supra, in which the conduit theory was argued, the sale-leaseback
and financing arrangements were effected simultaneously, and the buyer's rent payment
equaled the mortgage payments. The arrangement was found to be a valid sale-leaseback,
however, because the buyer put up a substantial sum of its own funds for the investment
and was personally liable on the loan, the property would not return to the lessee automati-
cally, and the option price was reasonable.
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are likely to find that a financing arrangement exists if the buyer-
lessor appears to be a mere conduit for the loan and loan pay-
ments. If it is not clear that the buyer-lessor is the mere conduit
for the payment of the loan, the analysis should continue. The
analysis also should continue if there is a three-party transaction
in which a financial institution is not involved as the third party.
Step II: Conduit Where No Financial Institution Is Involved
The conduit theory also may apply when a third party lender is
not a financial institution. The factors are the same as those which
apply when a financial institution is involved: (1) the sale-lease-
back and financing are arranged simultaneously; (2) the lease term
coincides with the term of the loan; (3) the rent payments coincide
with the interest and principal payments; and (4) the lender is as-
sured of obtaining the interest payment from the seller-lessee be-
cause the buyer-lessor is undercapitalized or otherwise unlikely to
make the payments.
Unger v. Campbell,157 a sale-leaseback case between related par-
ties, illustrates the conduit principle in a three-party transaction
with no financial institution. In Unger, a son sold equipment to his
mother and then leased it back. To finance the purchase the
mother signed an unsecured note to the son's company. The
mother, an immigrant who barely spoke English, had a net worth
of approximately $8,000 at the time she signed the note. The rental
payments of $2,000 per month were satisfied by the son depositing
a check in his mother's bank account. The payments on the un-
secured note were satisfied by the son drawing a check in the
amount of $1,500. The court concluded that the mother was a mere
conduit for the son's payments of rent and interest. The court cor-
rectly characterized the transaction as a sham and not a true
financing device. The sale-leaseback was entered into not for any
business purpose, but solely for tax purposes.
Here, as in Step I, part 2, other factors may override the four
indicators of a conduit. Those other factors include a significant
investment by the lessor, the probability that the property will re-
main with the buyer, and the fact that a transaction is at arm's-
157. 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9163 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
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Step III. The Likelihood That the Leased Property Will Revert
Automatically to the.Seller-Lessee
If the title to the leased property is retained by or will revert to
the seller-lessee at the end of the lease term, the seller-lessee
should be considered the owner because the lessee not only pos-
sesses the property during the lease term but also will own the
property at the end of that term. The cases in the sale-leaseback
area, and in particular the option to purchase cases, indicate the
importance of this factor.159
To summarize Step III of the decision model: if title is to revert
to the seller-lessee by the end of the lease or if title is retained by
the seller-lessee, the courts should find a financing device. The ab-
sence of the transfer of title has no probative value. Thus, the
analysis must continue.
Step IV Bargain Purchase Price or Economic Compulsin to Ex-
ercise the Optin
When courts in sale-leaseback cases determine that there is "ec-
onomic compulsion" for the lessee to exercise the option, they
unanimously conclude that a financing device exists.160 This factor
similarly is determinative in option to purchase cases."' 1 The same
158. See Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980), in which the Commissioner in
effect argued that there was a conduit relationship by asserting that the transaction between
Safeway Stores, a financing corporation, and certain investors was like Lazarus and not
Lyon. See note 138 & accompanying text supra.
159. In Miller v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 767 (1977), the seller-lessee had a reversionary
interest that guaranteed that the property would return to the college. See notes 44-46 &
accompanying text supra. In Cynthia Schaefer, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,440 (1980), title never
was transferred to the buyer. See notes 58-72 & accompanying text supra. The court ob-
served that "it is incredible that a purchaser would buy a piece of real property without
obtaining good title." 49 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1916. A transfer of title is much more common in
option to purchase cases in which, whenever title is transferred to the lessee by the end of
the lease term, a financing arrangement results. See Hill v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH)
481 (1979); Rochester Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1213 (1977); Mary A.
Browning, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 1061 (1950); Renner & Marcus, Inc., 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 451 (1950);
Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 446 (1949); Helser Mach. & Marine Works, Inc.,
39 B.T.A. 644 (1939).
160. See notes 23-43 & accompanying text supra.
161. When "economic compulsion" exists in option to purchase contexts, there is a sale,
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rationale as in the prior step is important here. If the lessee, in
addition to having a possessory interest in the property, is likely to
own the property at the end of the lease term because the option
price is so low as to be irresistable, then he should be considered
the owner from the outset.
Unlike the prior step, however, one cannot merely examine the
lease documents to determine "economic compulsion." In general,
but not always, "economic compulsion" depends on value consider-
ations. The main factor is the reasonableness of the repurchase op-
tion price. If the option price is unreasonably low, there will be
compulsion to exercise the option. Reasonableness is determined at
the time of execution of the original lease agreement. A hindsight
approach generally is shunned because numerous circumstances
could arise during the term of the lease to change the value of the
property The fact that the option may be exercisable at different
times during the term and renewal terms of the lease adds to the
complexity of the analysis and demands that a prospective ap-
proach be used. To complicate the matter further, the courts pro-
vide little guidance as to what is reasonable.162
Another important factor in determining economic compulsion is
the useful life of the property subject to the lease. An option is
unlikely to be exercised if the property is not going to be useful at
not a lease, and the lessee is treated as the owner. See M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner,
446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g in part & rev'g in part 54 T.C. 385 (1970); Haggard v.
Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956); Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35 (9th Cir.
1932); Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931); Burroughs Ad-
ding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925); Cal-Mame Foods, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 383 (1977); Smith v. Comissioner, 51 T.C. 429 (1968); Van Val-
kenburgh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 753 (1967); Lensing v. Commissioner, 20
T.C.M. (CCH) 1399 (1961); Whitman v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 250 (1951); Mc-
Waters v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 507 (1950); Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 446
(1949); Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948); Helser Mach. & Marine Works, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 39 B.T.A. 644 (1939); Smith v. Commissioner, 70 B.T.A. 27 (1930); Holeproof Ho-
siery Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928).
162. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), the Supreme Court refused
to speculate on whether the renewals or repurchase options would be exercised but did con-
clude, apparently without the use of appraisals or experts, that the option prices were rea-
sonable. Similarly, in American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1974),
and Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979), the option prices were considered
by the courts to be reasonable but the bases for these determinations were unclear. See
notes 98-106 & accompanying text supra. See also Keeling v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 954, 959 (1971); notes 78-81 & accompanying text supra.
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the time the option is exercisable. This useful life factor is dis-
cussed in the next step of the decision model.
A determination of "economic compulsion" may not always de-
pend purely on fair market value considerations, i.e., the antici-
pated value of the property at the end of the lease term and the
amount that must be paid at that time. In fact, the option price
may be nominal and yet no economic compulsion may result.16 3
Conversely, the option price may be reasonable yet economic com-
pulsion may exist.1 6 4
To summarize Step IV of the decision model: if the seller-lessee
is compelled economically to exercise the repurchase option, the
courts should consider the transaction a financing arrangement.
They need make no further inquiries. Based on the above discus-
sion, economic compulsion could exist when the repurchase option
is nominal in value in relation to the expected value of the prop-
erty or when a valid business reason existing at the time of the
initial sale-lease transaction compels the exercise of the option, un-
less some other reason, such as the financial condition of the lessee,
indicates that the option will not be exercised. Absent economic
compulsion the court should proceed with the analysis.
Step V" Comparison of Lease Terms with Useful Life of Property
Another key consideration is whether the lease term plus renew-
als is greater than or equal to the useful life of the property. A
rationale similar to that in the prior three steps exists here: a
seller-lessee entitled to possess and use the property for its entire
economic life should be considered the owner of the property.
Under these circumstances the lessee surrenders nothing as a re-
sult of the sale-leaseback.
163. See Keeling v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 954 (1971), in which despite a low
option price the taxpayer's financial condition indicated that the option would not be
exercised.
164. See Comtel Corp. v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1967) aff'g 45 T.C. 294
(1965), an option to purchase case, in which stock in a hotel was "sold" for $8,000,000 and
was bought back several months later for $8,872,000. Although this option price was a sub-
stantial sum, the court found economic compulsion because of the taxpayer's overriding de-
sire to have the underlying assets that the stock represented. This business purpose existed




This test vares depending on the subject of the lease. If land,
which ostensibly lasts forever, is the subject of the lease, the lease
term plus renewals essentially must be in perpetuity. When both
land and buildings are the subject of the lease it is difficult to sep-
arate the life of the land from that of the buildings. The courts
generally fail to articulate any clear rule here even though most
sale-leaseback cases fall into this category."6 5 If the term lasts for-
ever, as in several cases discussed earlier, a financing arrangement
should be deemed to exist.""6 When only buildings or equipment
are the subject of the lease, the useful life is more easily deter-
mined.167 Although easily determinable for buildings and equip-
ment, useful life does not appear to be a major court consideration.
In option to purchase cases, useful life is more likely to be ex-
amined.16e Unfortunately, even in these cases, many of which in-
volve equipment only, application of the useful life criterion is in-
consistent. This probably is due to the difficulty of determining
economic life. Although courts are accustomed to calculating useful
life for depreciation purposes, they are not well-equipped, in the
absence of expert opinion, to discuss the various factors which
enter into the determination of useful life.
To summarize Step V of the decision model: when the term of
the lease plus renewals clearly is greater than or equal to the useful
life of the property, the courts should find a financing device.
When the economic life of the property is unclear or difficult to
determine, the courts should proceed with the analysis.
Step VI: Rate of Return Similarities
With the typical loan, the rate of return is a nonfluctuating fixed
percentage over a stated period of time. Were a sale-leaseback con-
165. The "general rule" in the real estate business could be used to establish useful life.
See Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305, 354 n.24 (1980). In the alternative, expert opinion
could be used.
166. See notes 23-31 & accompanying text supra.
167. In Hilton m which the property leased was a department store, the court found that
the lessee's control over the property for virtually its entire life showed that the lessee would
"be in a position to realize the true economic value of the property by the simple expedient
of using the property." 74 T.C. at 358.
168. See T. Wayne Davis, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) T 78,348 (1978); Rev. Rul. 590, 1968-2 C.B. 66;
Rev. Rul. 541, 1955-2 C.B. 19. See also Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th
Cir. 1959); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F Supp. 539 (D. Vt. 1964).
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strued as a loan, the rent most likely would be fixed over the lease
term and the option price would be exercisable at various times
during the term at a flat percentage of the purchase price, declin-
ing each year. Certainly many sale-leaseback arrangements could
be construed as a loan because the rent could be considered inter-
est by converting the rent into a percentage of the sales price and
the option price could be considered the remaining principal due.
Apparently, therefore, the rate of return is not probative unless it
is compared with the generally expected rate of return for financ-
mg of the kind in question and, more importantly, compared to the
fair market rental value and option prices.1 19
1. Are There No Rate of Return Similarities?
No financing arrangement exists when the rental payments and
option price in a sale-leaseback transaction have no loan similari-
ties. This usually occurs when the rentals are based on a percent-
age of profits or of gross revenue. When rents are so determined
there generally is a risk normally not associated with a loan
transaction. 170
2. Are There Clear Rate of Return Similarities?
In many cases the loan similarities of rentals and options to in-
terest and principal are obvious; the parties often make no attempt
to disguise these characteristics.1 7 1 Most financing arrangements,
169. A rate of return test is part of the IRS Audit Manual, "Equipment Leasing Tax
Shelters" (CCH) ch. 800, 1 873. There are, however, no such guidelines for real estate.
170. Thus in Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979), an important factor in
the court's determination of no financing arrangement was the fact that the rents were
based on a percentage of revenues from the motel, restaurant, and bar which were the sub-
ject of the lease. The court found that these revenues could not be calculated accurately m
advance, given the newness of the business. Thus uncertainty existed as to whether these
payments would be made. But Cynthia Schaefer, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 80,440 (1980), illus-
trates that with an established ongoing business in which rents based on profits or gross
revenues are not uncertain and the lender could be assured of a risk-free return, there still
may be a financing arrangement. In a case such as Schaefer, further analysis is necessary
before concluding there is or is not a financing arrangement.
171. Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), is a clear example. See
notes 49-57 & accompanying text supra. The rentals were "mathematically geared to amor-
tize the moneys advanced by the trust at the agreed annual rate of 4.625% over the primary
term of the lease." 562 F.2d at 266. Also there was a Schedule of Direct Reduction Loan
attached to the leases which set forth the interest rate, the amount of the principal loan, the
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however, attempt to disguise any loan characteristics. For example,.
a financing arrangement could arise when there is no option to
purchase, and the rent payments thus would constitute both prin-
cipal and interest. Although no sale-leaseback case has dealt with
this situation, such a circumstance most likely would occur when
the life of the property is coextensive with the term of the lease. In
such a context no option is necessary to protect the interests of the
lessee. 172 A financing arrangement also may arise when there are no
rental payments. Thus, the option price would constitute both in-
terest and principal. Again, no cited sale-leaseback case has dealt
with this situation. 173 Such a case most likely would arise when the
time between execution of the transaction and exercise of the op-
tion is so short that no substantial hardship could result to the
lessor-lender from not receiving rent for a short period of time.
In the typical financing circumstance in which the loan charac-
teristics are disguised, both rent payments and an option price are
present. Under these circumstances, either: (1) the rents could re-
present not only interest but part of the principal; or (2) the rent
could represent part interest and the option price could represent
part interest and principal. The first situation is more likely to oc-
cur given the time-value of money. In Frito-Lay v. United
term of years, the payment under, and the apportionment of the quarterly payment between
principal and interest. The rents represented the going market rate of return. Despite the
fact that the sales price, which was the cost of recently purchased real estate, arguably re-
flected the fair market value of the property, the court held there was a financing arrange-
ment. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), although there were close
similarities between the rentals and options to interest and principal payments, the Court
found no financing arrangement. The results in Sun Oil and Lyon probably differ because
the rents and options were considered reasonable in Lyon, whereas the rents and option
prices were considered unreasonable in Sun Oil. In Sun Oil, both rental payments and op-
tion prices declined over the years even though the subject of the lease was unimproved real
estate which, arguably, would appreciate.
172. This is illustrated by the following lease/conditional sale cases: Estate of Starr v.
Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959); Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner,
271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959); Gem Inc. v. United States, 192 F Supp. 841 (W.D. Miss. 1961);
T. Wayne Davis, 348 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 78 (1978); Rochester Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1213 (1977); San Diego Transit-Mixed Concrete Co., 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 743
(1967); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. United States, 8 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5361 (1961).
See also Rev. Rul. 290, 1974-1 C.B. 41; Rev. Rul. 122, 1960-1 C.B. 56; Rev. Rul. 371, 1957-2
C.B. 214.
173. See note 164 supra.
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States,174 involving a two-party transaction and no financial insti-
tution, the rentals paid by Frito-Lay to Jones represented 7.5% of
the total cost of the construction. The IRS succeeded in its asser-
tion that the construction cost constituted the principal, 4.33% of
the rentals constituted interest (which was allowed as a deduction),
and the remaining 3.2% of the rentals represented return of prin-
cipal. Transactions such as Frito-Lay in which loan characteristics
are disguised are difficult to analyze. Therefore, in these circum-
stances, courts should not find a financing arrangement but should
proceed with the analysis. If, however, a court finds that (1) the
rentals represent interest on the "loan" or "sales" proceeds, (2) the
option prices represent the unamortized principal payment, (3) the
rentals and option prices represent going rates for investments of
that type .on the market,17' and (4) the rents and options do not
reflect fair market value rents and options,76 the court should con-
clude that a financing arrangement exists; no further analysis is
necessary
Step VII. Value Dispanties
Substantial disparity in the actual payments made under the
lease and their fair market equivalents clearly can indicate a
financing arrangement. The actual payments of consequence are
the sales price, rental payments, and option price. As mentioned in
Step IV, reasonable option prices are very important in determin-
ing the validity of a sale-leaseback. The rentals and sales prices
also are relevant.
1. Is the Sales Price Too High or Too Low in Relation to the
Fair Market Value of the Property or the Cash Flow from the
Property2
The sales price in relation to the fair market value of the prop-
erty and to the value of the interest purchased are key considera-
174. 209 F Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
175. The going rate of return is the rate of return a similar investment would yield. Thus,
a speculative investment would yield a high interest rate relative to a risk-free investment.
An example of a risk-free investment is a bank account or treasury bill.
176. In effect, by determining that the rent is interest, the court determines that the rent
does not reflect fair market rental values. See note 171 supra.
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tions in determining whether a sale-leaseback is valid. The cases
indicate that the sales price is extremely important when
nonrecourse financing is involved. In a nonrecourse context in
which the sales price of the property exceeds its fair market value,
the leasing transaction is not recognized for tax purposes. 17
In a sale-leaseback in which recourse financing is involved, a low
sales price rather than a high sales price is a key consideration. In
several of the cases discussed earlier, in which a financial institu-
tion was the buyer-lessor, a low sales price indicated a financing
arrangement. 17  In those cases the lessor-lender was not willing to
supply funds to the full extent of the property value.
The courts do not examine the sales price unless it is blatantly
unreasonable. Apparently the courts believe that a small difference
between the sales price and the value of the property is unimpor-
tant given the difficulty of making that determination.179 In only
177. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); David L. Narver,
Jr., 75 T.C. 53 (1980); see notes 115-118 & accompanying test supra.
178. See notes 23-43 & accompanying text supra.
179. The difficulty of determining the fair market value of the property is evidenced by
the sale-leaseback cases m which the issue is whether a sale or a like-lnd exchange has
taken place. In Standard Envelope Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 41 (1950), the experts'
estimates of the property value varied from $60,000 to $132,750. The discrepancy was in
part due to the fact that, because some appraisers had no personal familiarity with compa-
rable properties, they examined courthouse records. Yet, in Century Elec. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), af'g 15 T.C. 581 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954
(1952), the amounts on the real estate tax assessment records were considered to be the fair
market value. In May Dep't Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 547 (1951), the court deter-
mined the fair market value by looking at a recent purchase offer made by an independent
third party. The court pointed out the importance of the timing factor, noting that the time
of sale, not the time of trial or condemnation, was the proper time for examining fair market
value. In Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974), the seller and
buyer had different bases for valuation. The buyer's appraiser based his estimate on capital-
ization of annual net income that the lessor might reasonably anticipate. The seller, on the
other hand, obtained an appraisal excluding leasehold interests. The seller specifically asked
the appraiser to appraise the land as if the buildings
were owned by someone other than itself (thereby obviating the maintenance
and service wage constrictions emanating from brotherhood involvement);
were free and clear of any and all encumbrances (including leasehold inter-
ests); were salable and carried marketable title; and were to be ex-
posed for sale in the open market without contingencies or restrictions.
Id. at 1389.
As Missouri Pacific indicates, a multitude of factors affects fair market value. An example
of one unusual factor occurred in Century Electric, in which the fact that the college was
not subject to general state, city, and school taxes allegedly gave the property a "premium."
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one case, American Realty Trust, did the court emphasize the rea-
sonableness of the sales price. In that case, the sales price was a
close gauge on the reasonableness of the option price because the
options could be exercised shortly after the sale at values of eighty-
eight to ninety-two percent of the sales price.1 s0 In most instances,
however, the courts do not even consider the reasonableness of the
sales price.181
With nonrecourse financing it is important not only to determine
the reasonableness of the sales price but also to ensure that the
value of the interest acquired by the buyer-lessee is not less than
the amount paid for that interest. If the buyer can "abandon" the
transaction because he has nothing to lose by doing so, the buyer's
investment in the property is insufficient and he should not be
considered the owner. In fact, when the value of the interest ac-
quired is less than the amount paid for it, the motive behind the
transaction should be examined. In such a case the buyer likely
seeks tax losses.18 2
Frequently, valuation depends upon the terms of the lease. For example, in Standard En-
velope, the provision in the lease requiring the purchaser to invest up to $50,000 in improve-
ments in the property was an important consideration in calculating the fair market value of
the property transferred.
180. 498 F.2d at 1196.
181. In Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979), the court was unclear as to
whether the sales price reflected the fair market value. Arguably, it was reasonable because
it included a $35,000 profit factor on a $1,502,000 price. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,
435 U.S. 561 (1978), and Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962),
the selling prices arguably were unreasonably low, and certainly less than fair market value.
In Lyon, the sales price of $7,640,000 was based on the parties' estimate of the cost of con-
struction, and yet the actual cost was $10,000,000. In Frito-Lay the sales price similarly
related to the cost of construction and not to the fair market value of the property con-
structed. There the court concentrated on the nominal option price in finding a financing
device.
182. In Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980); see notes 119-130 & accompanying
text supra, the amount the buyers paid for the property went to the lawyers for commission.
On the basis of expert testimony, the court concluded that the buyer-lessor would obtain no
economic gain from the rental payments, no gain on sale of the property, and no gain if the
repurchase option were exercised. The court disregarded possible gain on condemnation be-
cause condemnation was not a likely event.
In Cynthia Schaefer, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) T 80,440 (1980), the lessors made no initial payment
for the property. The lessors could not gain from the sale of the property because any profit,
up to $40,000, went to the lessee. In addition, the lessor could not gain from the rental
payments because it was unlikely that more than $10,000 rent would be paid (even though
the lease provided for a sharing of profits and all rent went to pay the purchase price of the
property).
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To summarize this part of Step VII: if nonrecourse financing is
involved, the court should determine whether the sales price is
greater than the fair market value of the property or whether the
value of the interest purchased is less than the amount paid for
that interest. If either of these circumstances exists the courts
should find an invalid sale-leaseback arrangement. If recourse
financing is involved and the sales price is significantly less than
the fair market value of the property, there is a financing arrange-
ment; otherwise the analysis should continue.
2. Do the Rental Payments Reflect Fair Market Value?
In all cited sale-leaseback cases in which the rent was reasonable
a true lease was found.183 The reasonableness of the rent alone,
however, is not determinative, for a financing arrangement may be
found if other factors are overriding.184
In all cited sale-leaseback cases in which the rentals are unrea-
sonably low the court characterized the transaction as a financing
device.185 High rents also may indicate a financing arrangement.
Although no case in the sale-leaseback area illustrates this point,
in the. option to purchase cases high rentals frequently indicate
financing devices. 188 Application of rents to the option price is a
significant factor as well in option to purchase cases, but in sale-
leaseback cases this factor is not controlling. 87
183. See notes 73-106 & accompanying text supra.
184. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F Supp. 886, 892 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
185. See notes 24-29, 36-46, 119-130 & accompanying text supra.
186. See, e.g., M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971); Martin v.
Commissioner, 379 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1967); Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th
Cir. 1956); Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1932); Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931); Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d
54 (8th Cir. 1925); Rochester Dev. Corp., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1213 (1977); Van Valkenburgh v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 753 (1967); Lensing v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH)
1399 (1961); Beus v. Commissioner, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9945 (1958); Whitham v. Commis-
sioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 250 (1951); McWaters v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 507
(1950); Renner & Marcus, Inc., 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 451 (1950); Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.
446 (1949); Smith v. Commissioner, 70 B.T.A. 27 (1930); Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928). See also Rev. Rul. 542, 1955-2 C.B. 59.
187. See Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979); Keeling v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 30,969 (1971). See also Martin v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1967);
Lensing v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1399 (1961); Alexander v. Commissioner, 17
T.C.M. (CCH) 221 (1958); Whitham v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 250 (1957); Chicago
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To summarize: if the rents are unreasonably high or unreasona-
bly low, this is indicative but not determinative of a financing ar-
rangement. If the payments are not clearly unreasonable, the anal-
ysis should continue.
Step VIII. Benefits and Burdens: Does the Equity Interest Lie
with the Seller-Lessee?
In a typical loan arrangement, the equity interest lies with the
seller-lessee. The lender assumes little risk and also possesses little
opportunity for gain. An equity interest comprises a number of
factors, some of which already have been discussed. For example,
high rents may indicate that the seller-lessee is building up an eq-
uity interest in the property That the useful life of the property
coincides or is less than the lease term plus renewals also indicates
that the seller-lessee has an equity interest in the property. Simi-
larly, the fact that title automatically reverts to the lessee or that
the lessee is economically compelled to exercise the option indi-
cates that the lessee holds an equity interest. Conversely, a sales
price that exceeds the fair market value of the property or a gain
from the property that is less than the investment indicates the
absence of an equity interest.
Equity also includes all the "benefits and burdens" of owner-
ship.188 The benefits that the courts have pointed to as indicating
the existence of an equity interest are: (1) the benefits of apprecia-
tion; (2) the receipts of the condemnation award or other insurance
proceeds; (3) the right to control the assignment of the lease; (4)
the right to control the improvements on the leased property; and
(5) the right to sublet the property.
The risks and responsibilities that courts use to indicate the ex-
Stoker, Inc. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 441 (1950); Browning v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1061 (1950); McWaters v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 507 (1950); Goldfields of
America, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 200 (1941); Helser Mach. & Marine Works, Inc.,
39 B.T.A. 644 (1939).
In the option to purchase area some courts find a financing device when rents are applied
to the option price. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 429 (1968); Norman Van Val-
kenburgh, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 67,162 (1967); Rev. Rul. 590, 1968-2 C.B. 66. But see Lester v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 711 (1959); WBSR, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 747 (1958)
188. The IRS Audit Manual, "Equipment Leasing Tax Shelter" (CCH) ch. 800, V 852
adopts a burdens and benefits test.
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istence of an equity interest in the seller-lessee are: (1) the risks of
depreciation; (2) the responsibilities for making improvements; (3)
a provision that the lessee will insure the premises for the benefit
of the lessor; (4) an indemnity clause that holds the lessor-creditor
harmless against all liabilities; (5) personal liability on the loan; (6)
the existence of a net lease; (7) a provision that rent is to be paid
in all circumstances; (8) a provision that no diminution of the rent
will result from casualty or condemnation; and (9) the risk of cur-
rent operating losses.
Many of the provisions in lease forms are not and should not be
determinative of a valid sale-leaseback arrangement. Several courts
recognize that these provisions are "mere surplusage" in determin-
ing the validity of a lease transaction.189 Provisions which grant
one party the right to sublet or obtain condemnation proceeds, or
which allocate to one party the responsibility for carrying insur-
ance, paying- taxes, maintaining the property, paying rent abso-
lutely, and indemnifying or holding the other party harmless
against liability, have been so considered.
Net lease arrangements19" are found in all the valid sale-lease-
back arrangements cited and thus are not indicative of ownership.
They should be given no special consideration by planners and
courts in the decision analysis. Similarly, the courts generally find
that receipt of condemnation awards is not controlling. 191
189. Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980); Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner,
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 34,334 (1977); Keeling v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 30,969 (1971).
190. In a net lease, the lessee bears the burden of ordinary maintenance, repairs, taxes,
utility charges, and insurance, and he must keep the premises in good condition except for
reasonable wear.
191. In Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979), and Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), the condemnation award arguably benefited the lessee, but in
both cases the court found that the lessee was not the owner of the property. In Belz, the
lessee was entitled to insurance proceeds if the premises were destroyed and to all damages
awarded on condemnation. The court admitted that these provisions "might confer some
benefits on [the lessee] that a traditional lessee would not be expected to receive," and
noted "that the lease agreement in Frank Lyon contained insurance and condemnation
award provisions similar to those involved herein." 72 T.C. at 1229. In American Realty
Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974), the court also discussed the condem-
nation award. There, the phrasing of the award made it difficult to determine who had the
benefits or risk on condemnation. 498 F.2d at 1195. In Hilton, the judges heavily discounted
condemnation as a consideration in evaluating a potential source of economic gain because
"the act of condemnation lies wholly beyond the control of the owner or the lessee of prop-
erty, and since the amounts of awards cannot even be speculated in advance." 74 T.C. at
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Like the receipts of the condemnation award, the burden of pro-
viding improvements is not a significant factor m the sale-lease-
back cases. Most cases do not even mention this factor. In Amen-
can Realty Trust, in which the lessee bore the cost of some capital
improvements made on the property, the court never considered
this factor and assigned ownership to the lessor.192
A factor given considerable importance by the courts is the per-
sonal liability of the buyer-lessor on the loan, and this often is an
indicator of a valid sale-leaseback transaction.193 In contrast, some
cases conclude that the absence of personal liability is a neutral
factor.19 4
Another important factor is control over the leased property
This factor is particularly significant when the lessee fails to con-
sult the lessor as to major matters involving the leased property or
contravenes an express lease agreement as to matters concerning
the leased property 195
To summarize Step VIII: if the court finds that the substantial
burdens and benefits lie with the buyer-lessor they should find a
valid sale-leaseback. If, however, the clear equity interest lies with
the seller-lessee the transaction should be deemed a financing
arrangement.
Step IX. Purpose for Entering into the Transaction
If, after analyzing all the above factors, the court still cannot
358. There, the condemnation award went to the lessor unless the lessee made an offer to
purchase the property at a price equal to the unpaid principal and interest of the notes
outstanding.
192. 498 F.2d at 1198-99.
193. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); American Realty Trust v.
United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974); Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209
(1979).
194. Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305
(1980). These cases did not disregard who bore the economic gain or loss from the apprecia-
tion or depreciation in the value of the property. Both courts examined cash flows in estab-
lishing this factor. See part 1 of Step VI of the decision model.
195. Cynthia Schaefer, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) T 80,440 (1980), best illustrates this statement. In
Schaefer, the lessee granted an option on the leased property and reduced the lessor's prof-
its without the lessor's consent. Depreciation and rent deductions were denied. In David L.
Narver, Jr., 75 T.C. 53 (1980), the seller-lessee executed a lease assignment to the original
owner in partial payment of the lessee's purchase obligation to the original owner. No evi-
dence existed, however, that the lessors were informed of this assignment of rents.
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decide if the arrangement is a financing device, the court should
examine the purpose behind the transaction.196 Usually, however,
the presence of a valid business purpose for the transaction is not
as important as the absence of a tax avoidance purpose. 9 '
To summarize this last step in the decision model: if the sale-
leaseback transaction was entered into for a tax avoidance purpose,
it should not be recognized as a valid sale-leaseback.
CONCLUSION
This Article has set out a basic framework for judges and plan-
ners in analyzing the complex area of sale-leaseback transactions.
The decision model presented is based on sale-leaseback cases in-
volving recourse and nonrecourse financing. The steps in the model
can be summarized as follows:
Step L Financial Institutions as Parties to the Transaction
1. Is the buyer-lessor a financial institution?
If no, the analysis should continue (Step I, part 2).
If yes, but the financial institution is purchasing the property for
its own investment purposes, go to Step II.
If yes, and the financial institution is not purchasing the prop-
196. In Keeling v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 30,969 (1971), a major consideration
in the court's determination that the agreement was not a financing arrangement was the
fact that the petitioner did not initiate the sale-leaseback. The court stated that the sales
"negotiations were apparently well along before petitioner even became aware of their exis-
tence." Id. at 958.
197. In Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), the court determined that the fact
that the lessee had a financing purpose in entering into the transaction should not make any
difference in determining the validity of the transaction. The court stated that the seller-
lessee's financing requirement may be a valid business purpose to support a sale-leaseback
transaction for tax purposes. Id. at 346. The court recognized, however, that a tax avoidance
purpose would result in an invalid sale-leaseback arrangement and concluded that there was
"no justification for the petitioner's participation m this transaction apart from its tax con-
sequences." Id. at 361. In American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir.
1974), the court concluded that the deal was "not merely a tax avoidance device, that com-
mercial considerations underlay it," specifically the availability of a wrap-around mortgage.
498 F.2d at 1198. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), the fact that the
transaction was shaped by features other than tax avoidance-the diversification in the case
of Lyon and the legal requirements in the case of the lessee-bank-was an important con-
sideration. Similarly, the absence of evidence indicating that the transaction was tax moti-
vated or a sham was pointed to in Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979).
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erty for its own investment purposes, a financing arrangement ex-
ists. Whether the bank seeks the property as an investment is de-
termined by the intent and conduct of the parties.
2. Is a financial institution an indirect party to the sale-lease-
back transaction-.e., neither lessor nor lessee?
If no, the courts should proceed to Step II.
If yes, does the buyer-lessor merely serve as a conduit for the
payment of the loan from the seller-lessee to the financial institu-
tion? This is determined by examining the personal liability of the
buyer-lessor on the loan, whether the loan was guaranteed by the
seller-lessee, whether the buyer-lessor is undercapitalized, whether
the loan payments coincide with the rent payments, whether the
term of the loan coincides with the term of the lease, and whether
the financial institution views the seller-lessee as the true debtor.
If the court answers these questions affirmatively, the court should
conclude that there is a financing arrangement. If it is not clear
that the buyer-lessor is a mere conduit, the analysis should
continue.
Step I. Is There a Conduit Arrangement Even Though No Fi-
nancial Institution Is Involved?
The same factors discussed in part 2 of Step I should be consid-
ered. If a conduit relationship exists, there is a financing device. If
no such relationship exists, the analysis should continue.
Step 11. Will the Property Revert Automatically to the Seller-
Lessee by the End of the Lease Term?
If yes, there is a financing arrangement.
If no, the analysis must continue.
Step IV Is There a Bargain Purchase Price or Economic Compul-
sion to Exercise the Option?
If economic compulsion to exercise the option exists, the court
should find a financing transaction. Economic compulsion exists
when the repurchase option is a bargain purchase option or when
there is a valid business reason at the time of the initial sale-lease-
back transaction which compels the exercise of the option. No
compulsion exists if some other reason, such as the financial condi-
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tion of the lessee, indicates that the option will not be exercised.
If there is no economic compulsion the analysis should continue.
Step V Is the Term of the Lease Plus Renewals Greater Than or
Equal to the Useful Life of the Property?
If yes, there is a financing device.
If no, the analysis should proceed.
Step V. Rate of Return Similarities
1. Are there no rate of return similarities?
If the buyer-lessor is not entitled to a definite risk-free return,
no financing arrangement exists. There may be a valid sale-lease-
back, partnership, or joint venture arrangement, so the analysis
should continue.
2. Are there clear rate of return similarities?
If no, the analysis should continue
If yes, there is a financing arrangement.
Step VII. Value Dispanties
1. Is the sales price too high or too low in relation to the fair
market value of the property or the cash flow from the property?
If nonrecourse financing is involved, courts should determine
whether the sales price is greater than the fair market value of the
property or whether the value of the interest purchased is less than
the amount paid for that interest. If either of these circumstances
exist, the court should find an invalid sale-leaseback arrangement.
If recourse financing is involved, the analysis should continue.
2. Are the rental payments reflective of fair market value?
If the rents are unreasonably low or unreasonably high, this is
indicative but not determinative of a financing arrangement. If the
payments are not clearly unreasonable, the analysis should
continue.
Step VIII. Benefits and Burdens: Does the Equity Interest Lie
with the Seller-Lessee?
If yes, there is a financing device.
If no, a valid sale-leaseback arrangement probably exists but the
analysis should continue.
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Step IX. Purpose for Entering into the Transaction
If the actual purpose, as determined by the intent and conduct
of the parties, indicates that the transaction was entered into to
avoid tax, the sale-leaseback should not be recognized.
